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INTRODUCTION

A

s transnational firms traverse the planet in today’s global economy,
they conduct many of their business activities beyond the legal
reach of nation-states.1 To some, this seems like one of globalization’s
most troubling consequences.2 The conventional wisdom predicts that, if
unchecked, corporations will freely flout societal interests and impose
significant external costs on the public.3 However, globalization has been
expanding the role of nongovernmental actors in shaping global governance.4 This trend tends to placate detrimental corporate conduct in the
absence of governmental enforcement authority. 5 Indeed, globalization
has not only heralded a “global economy,” but has also brought about the
phenomenon of a broader “global civil society.”6 Increasingly alert to the
social and ecological dimensions of transnational corporate conduct,
global civil society stands to exert significant regulatory control over
firms simply by propounding public preferences and expectations.7 These
1. See generally John H. Dunning, Introduction to GOVERNMENTS, GLOBALIZATION,
H. Dunning ed., 1997) (discussing the emergent
relationship between the national jurisdiction and the mobility of multinational enterprise); KENICHI OHMAE, Preface to THE EVOLVING GLOBAL ECONOMY: MAKING SENSE OF
THE NEW WORLD ORDER, at xiii (Kenichi Ohmae ed., 1995); Peter E. Drucker, The Global Economy and the Nation State, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 1997, at 159 (discussing the
political economy of globalization and noting the dynamic of the relative decrease of
nation-states’ regulatory authority).
2. See generally RICHARD BARNET & RONALD MUELLER, GLOBAL REACH: THE
POWER OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 1 (1974) (providing an excellent discussion
on the dynamics that ensue as a result of multinational corporations’ global reach).
3. JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND
POWER 113 (2004).
4. See Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker, The Emergence of Private
Authority in the International System, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 3, 4 (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002); see
also James N. Rosenau, Governance in the Twenty-First Century, 1 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 13, 13–22 (1995); Jan Aart Scholte, ‘In The Foothills’: Relations Between
the IMF and Civil Society, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND AUTHORITY IN THE GLOBAL
SYSTEM 256, 256 (Richard A. Higgot, Geoffrey R. D. Underhill & Andreas Bieler eds,
2000). See generally A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler & Tony Porter, Private Authority
and International Affairs, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 3, 3 (A.
Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler & Tony Porter eds., 1999).
5. See THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 30–35
(1989).
6. See Cutler, Haufler & Porter, supra note 4, at 3, 20. See generally Ronnie D. Lipschutz & Cathleen Fogel, “Regulation for the rest of us?” Global Civil Society and the
Privatization of Transnational Regulation, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 115, 115 (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002).
7. See DONALDSON, supra note 5, at 30–35.
AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 1–2 (John
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preferences and expectations constrain corporate conduct and explain
why firms have begun to self-impose civil regulations that proactively
accommodate broader moral and social concerns.8
Also known as “soft law” 9 or “quasi-legislation,” 10 voluntary civil
regulations will prove an important alternative to governmental authority
in the era of globalization.11 These emerging trends are arguably only the
“tip” of a larger global social contract that has been forming in light of
society’s demand for corporate social responsibility (“CSR”).12 In fostering soft law, this new global governance paradigm13 reignites timeless
8. Jem Bendell uses the term “civil regulation” to refer to regimes situated between
self-regulation by business and “hard” regulation by government. Jem Bendell, Civil
Regulation: A New Form of Democratic Governance for the Global Economy?, in TERMS
FOR ENDEARMENT: BUSINESS, NGOS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 238, 246–49 (Jem
Bendell ed., 2000).
9. The term “soft law” generally refers to non-binding, quasi-legal instruments, or to
mechanisms whose binding force is relatively weaker than conventional legal instruments. See David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human
Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931,
960 (2004); see also Alan C. Neal, Corporate Social Responsibility: Governance Gain or
Laissez-Faire Figleaf?, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 459, 464 (2008). From the standpoint of the international law nomenclature, “soft law” refers to international agreements
not concluded as treaties and thus not yet binding. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, The
Role of Soft Law in a Global Order, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF
NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 100, 113–14 (Dinah Shelton
ed., 2000); Antonio Vives, Corporate Social Responsibility: The Role of Law and Markets and the Case of Developing Countries, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 199, 216 (2008). In
addition, “soft law” denotes a self-contained set of obligations arising out of the occasional preference of nation-states to reach non-binding agreements and to pattern relations in ways that avoid application of treaty or customary law. See Hartmut Hillgenberg,
A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 499, 501 (1999) (discussing the nature of
the transnational self-regulatory and co-regulatory structures); see also Rebecca Kathleen
Atkins, Multinational Enterprises and Workplace Reproductive Health: Extending Corporate Social Responsibility, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 233, 239 (2007); Ilias Bantekas,
Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 22 B. U. INT’L L.J. 309, 317
(2004); Ronen Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the
Contested Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 635, 645
(2004).
10. See GABRIELE GANZ, QUASI-LEGISLATION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SECONDARY LEGISLATION 16–22 (2d ed. 1987).
11. See Christoph Knill & Dirk Lehmkuhl, Private Actors and the State: Internationalization and Changing Patterns of Governance, 15 GOVERNANCE 41, 43 (2002).
12. See generally THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND: A
SOCIAL CONTRACTS APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS 233–36 (1999). In some sense, as a
form of voluntary governance, corporate social responsibility was precipitated by global
civil society’s pressure and constrains on multinational business interest.
13. Thomas Kuhn employed the term “paradigm” in an effort to account for the way
that fields of knowledge are constituted by shared systems of belief which are defined by
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principles and values such as human rights, environmental sustainability,
responsible citizenship, and corporate accountability, as well as integrity
and credibility of character.14 As a result transnational firms, despite their
wherewithal, are now vulnerable as their brands have become susceptible
to reputational harm in response to breaches of the social contract. 15
Consequently, these firms are establishing regulatory regimes in an effort
to build reputational capital and thereby enhance, or at least safeguard,
their bottom lines.16
Global civil society primarily demands that businesses abide norms of
social responsibility in their pursuit of profit. 17 This emphasis on the
“character” of transnational business conduct is a departure from the
entrenched metaphor that sees corporations as amoral profit machines,
utterly devoid of moral character or probity.18 The fact that transnational
firms adopt civil regulations voluntarily in order to build credibility in
the eyes of global civil society—i.e., the fact that firms proactively
a common vocabulary, a set of accepted problems and agreed-upon solutions. THOMAS S.
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 175 (2d ed. 1970). Thus, on the one
hand, a paradigm defines a community of belief; on the other hand, communities of belief
do not exist but for the shared beliefs, acknowledged problems and solutions that comprise a paradigm. See id. Although Kuhn’s book was aimed at the history of changes in
the physical or “hard” sciences, John Kenneth Galbraith expresses a similar notion that is
closer to the context of the present study: “The first requirement for an understanding of
contemporary economic and social life is a clear view of the relation between events and
the ideas which interpret them.” JOHN K. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 6 (4th ed.
1984). As to the emerging paradigm, stemming from the new forms of global corporate
governance, the following passage is prescient:
“Tomorrow’s successful company can no longer afford to be a faceless institution that
does nothing more than sell the right product at the right price. It will have to present
itself as if it were . . . an intelligent actor, of upright character, that brings explicit moral
judgment to bear on its dealings with its own employees and with the wider world.”
Anonymous, Saints and Sinners, THE ECONOMIST, June 24, 1995, at 15.
14. See generally William C. Frederick, The Moral Authority of Transnational Corporate Codes, 10 J. BUS. ETHICS 165, 165 (1991) (discussing how moral guidelines incorporated in various regulatory instruments influence sundry corporate practices).
15. See Harold James, The Ethics of Business Life: Some Historical Reflections, in
RETHINKING BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 9, 14–15 (Samuel Gregg & James R. Stoner eds.,
2008).
16. Kevin T. Jackson, Natural Law, Human Rights, and Corporate Reputational Capital in Global Governance, 8 CORP. GOVERNANCE 440, 451 (2008).
17. See generally LYNN S. PAINE, VALUE SHIFT: WHY COMPANIES MUST MERGE
SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL IMPERATIVES TO ACHIEVE SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE 47 (2003)
(arguing that beyond good public relations, corporate social responsibility is a powerful
tool for achieving superior performance and generating greater profits).
18. See generally Gareth Morgan, Paradigms, Metaphors and Problem Solving in
Organization Theory, 25 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 605, 616. (1980) (providing a critique of the
metaphors that have “imprisoned” organization theory).
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comply with the new global social contract—presupposes that international businesses are able to distinguish moral choices and then make
them.19
Unlike traditional legal regimes whose norms are enforced through
centralized systems of sanctions, the emergent soft law norms of global
economic governance rely on decentralized enforcement mechanisms.20
These emergent norms are not the product of parochial regulation or
local cultural mores.21 Rather, they represent the expectations of various
economic communities around the world that together comprise global
civil society.22 Thus, the promulgation of voluntary civil regulations by
firms reveals an acceptance of extant global social contracts borne of
growing global societal consensus as to the proper performance, responsiveness, and responsibility of transnational corporations.23
Consequently, transnational business enterprises are further committing to rule-making and rule-implementation in the spheres of social and
environmental responsibility. 24 They engage in inter-firm cooperation
and collaborate with nongovernmental organizations. 25 Over the past
decade, CSR has gained prominence in both developed and developing
countries at local, national, regional, and international levels. 26 International businesses are therefore under increasing pressure from civil
society organizations and corporate accountability networks that monitor

19. See Kenneth E. Goodpaster & John B. Matthews Jr., Can a Corporation Have a
Conscience?, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 132, 135.
20. See RICHARD HOLME & PHILIP WATTS, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY:
MAKING GOOD BUSINESS SENSE 20 (2000); see also Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization,
Governance and Corporate Citizenship, 1 J. CORP. CITIZENSHIP 15, 15–23 (2001).
21. See generally CYNTHIA DAY WALLACE, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISE 23 (1982) (providing examples and discussing distinctions among various
forms of regulation).
22. See id. at 295–96; see also Scholte, supra note 20, at 19–21.
23. See Thomas W. Dunfee, Business Ethics and Extant Social Contracts, 1 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 23, 24 (1991).
24. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 18
(2000); see also Cutler, Haufler & Porter, supra note 4, at 3.
25. See SIMON ZADEK, THE CIVIL CORPORATION: THE NEW ECONOMY OF CORPORATE
CITIZENSHIP 91 (rev. ed. 2007). See generally CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY:
READING AND CASES IN GLOBAL CONTEXT 1 (Andrew Crane, Dirk Matten & Laura
Spence eds., 2008).
26. See generally Archie Carroll, Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a
Definitional Construct, 38 BUS. & SOC’Y 268, 268 (1999); Dirk Matten & Andrew Crane,
Corporate Citizenship: Toward an Extended Theoretical Conceptualization, 30 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 166, 166 (2005).
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business conduct. 27 In response, these firms are adopting responsible
business policies.28
Although the conventional views of corporate governance—
”shareholder theory” and “stakeholder theory”29—reach divergent conclusions about the proper nature and scope of CSR, both evolved at a
time when firms were constrained, at least in principle, by the rule of law
and legal sanctions. 30 Yet, unlike traditional hard law enforcement
regimes, today’s emerging “civil regulations” are grounded in the “rule
of reputation,” which ties accountability solely to reputational capital, or
lack thereof.31 Operating internationally and faced with pressure to selfregulate, a company’s reputation has become one of its most valuable
assets.32 Today’s companies must reconcile economic and moral value
with traditional notions of corporate governance.

27. See generally Andreas Georg Scherer & Guido Palazzo, Toward a Political Conception of Corporate Responsibility: Business and Society Seen from a Habermasian
Perspective, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 1096, 1096–120 (2007).
28. See ZADEK, supra note 25, at 63.
29. Shareholder theory states that the corporation should serve the interests of shareholders only. See ARCHIE B. CARROLL & ANN K. BUCHHOLTZ, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY:
ETHICS AND STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT 832–85 (7th ed. 2009). Grounded in agency
theory, the underlying idea is that shareholders differ from other constituencies by virtue
of being residual risk-bearers, and as such should exercise control over the firm. See id. at
84. Agency theory further asserts that, as residual risk-bearers, shareholders are in the
best position to ensure that firms operate efficiently and focus on profit maximization.
Thus, corporate managers answer only to shareholders and act only with the interests of
shareholders in mind. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962).
Stakeholder theory, on the other hand, maintains that since business serves the larger
society, managers must be responsive to a broad constellation of constituencies both
within and outside of the firm. See R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A
STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 43 (1984). This theory is based on the premise that the employees of a corporation, especially its managers and directors, can be held accountable
for harmful side-effects of corporate conduct. Id. Corporate employees should be held
accountable for the realization of a variety of objectives of the corporation. Such widening of responsibility is deemed essential as stockholders’ liability is often remote and
financially limited. Id.; see also Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Business Ethics and Stakeholder
Analysis, 1 BUS. ETHICS Q. 53, 53–55 (1991). See generally Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Shareholders, 21 STETSON L. REV. 121, 126 (1991).
30. Thomas Dunfee, Corporate Governance in a Market with Morality, 62 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1999, 129, 134–35.
31. See KEVIN T. JACKSON, BUILDING REPUTATIONAL CAPITAL: STRATEGIES FOR
INTEGRITY AND FAIR PLAY THAT IMPROVE THE BOTTOM LINE 28 (2004); see also Jackson,
supra note 16, at 443–44.
32. Alasdair Ross, Reputation: Risk of Risks, THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT,
Dec. 2005, at 2; see Robert O. Keohane, Complex Accountability and Power in Global
Governance: Issues for Global Business, 8 CORP. GOVERNANCE 361, 365 (2008).
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In this Article, I will argue that corporate governance must focus on
the role of soft law in today’s global environment. Soft law is a novel
mechanism for constraining corporate behavior. In reconciling financial
and social imperatives, firms must consider its impact on reputational
capital. In Part I, I analyze the emergence of the CSR paradigm and its
connection to global corporate governance. By examining its history, I
will first illustrate how the CSR movement has rendered firms’ reputations accountable to the movement’s demands, and then I will trace the
conceptual expansion of CSR to the related notions of “corporate social
responsiveness” and “corporate social performance.” In Part II, I
examine alternative conceptual models of global corporate governance
including the “monophonic” model, the “polyphonic” model, the “integrative social contracts” model, and finally, the “reputational capital”
model. In Part III, I examine specific types of global civil regulations in
detail, and I discuss the bases for why global corporations accept the
emerging soft law regime. After highlighting the chief characteristics of
civil regulations in light of the underlying regulatory aim to bind firms
and markets to worldwide norms, I will discuss the dominant forms of
civil regulation within the triad of voluntary self-regulation, inter-firm
and cross-industry initiatives, and co-regulation and multi-stakeholder
partnerships.33 In Part IV, I build on the discussion in Parts II and III to
analyze the role reputational accountability mechanisms play in securing
firms’ compliance with global civil regulations. After distinguishing
reputational accountability from legal accountability, I will explain the
operational components of reputational accountability, the process by
which key constituents of transnational firms enforce the “rule of reputation,” and the strategic and operational implications firms face as a
result of such enforcement. In Part V, I take on arguments in opposition
to the emerging paradigm of global civil regulation.
I. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE PARADIGM
A. History of Corporate Social Responsibility
The origins of the modern debate on corporate social responsibility can
be traced to the early 1950s. Howard Bowen, a renowned economist, first
coined the phrase when he argued that economic and social benefits
would result if businesses introduced broader social goals into their

33. See David Vogel, The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct 25–26
(Center for Responsible Business, Working Paper No. 34, 2006), available at http://
escholarship.org/uc/item/8g66g3hf.
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decision-making processes.34 In the 1960s, the argument was extended
further with the assertion that ethical principles should govern a corporation’s relationship with society.35 In the 1970s, the view emerged that
business should not only protect but also improve the welfare of society.36
Regarding the global context, attention to the ethics of international
business has been mounting ever since the late 1960s.37 It began as an
activist movement aimed at U.S.-based multinational companies in
France and later spread to other parts of the world. 38 Less-developed
countries were especially worried about outside infiltration into their
economies and the resulting dilution of national control. Yet, at the same
time, as a means of economic development, they were interested in
attracting foreign investment that would lead to a rise in employment.
The expansion of direct foreign investment around the world prompted
attempts to create codes of business conduct at the intra-firm and international levels.39 One notable example of this dynamic could be seen as
early as the 1940s with the promulgation in the United Nations of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.40 Another later example is the
attempted development of a Voluntary Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”) beginning in the 1970s.41 Similarly, national legis34. See, e.g., HOWARD ROTHMANN BOWEN, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
BUSINESSMAN 8 (1953).
35. See RICHARD EELLS & CLARENCE WALTON, CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF
BUSINESS 455–57 (3d ed. 1961).
36. See KEITH P. DAVIS & ROBERT L. BLOMSTROM, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY:
ENVIRONMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 8–9, 20–21 (3d ed. 1975).
37. See generally BARNET & MUELLER, supra note 2, at 113 (1974); JEAN JACQUES
SERVAN-SCHREIBER, Le Défi américain [THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE] 1 (1968) (Fr.) (providing a provocative angle on America-style management, business, and ethics);
RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY 1 (1971) (a seminal book that was widely
acclaimed to be “no more than the tip of an iceberg”).
38. See, e.g., BARNET & MUELLER, supra note 2, at 113.
39. See DONALDSON, supra note 5, at 35–39; see also Paul M. Minus, Introduction to
THE ETHICS OF BUSINESS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 1, 1 (Paul M. Minus ed., 1993); ROBERT
C. SOLOMON, THE NEW WORLD OF BUSINESS: ETHICS AND FREE ENTERPRISE IN THE
GLOBAL 1990S, at 167 (1994). See generally THEODORE H. MORAN, MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 1 (1985) (presenting an extensive and a thorough discussion of the sociopolitical developments resulting from spread of multinational corporations).
40. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
41. See Development and International Economic Cooperation: Transnational Corporations, U.N. ESCOR, 2nd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/1990/94 (June 12, 1990); see also Draft
United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, 23 I.L.M. 626 (1984)
(setting forth comprehensive norms of transnational corporate conduct). Moreover, in
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latures, backed by enforcement regimes, adjusted their laws to reach
transnational firms doing business overseas.42 International treaties and
national legislation, however, did not succeed everywhere in combating
misconduct. Rather, in a significant number of cases, business reforms
were precipitated by public outrage at corporate malfeasance.43
In the 1980s, a number of ecological and social calamities began impacting the reputations of individual firms and the corporate world in
general.44 The ensuing reputational crises vividly illustrated the consequences of embracing a self-regulating, profit-maximizing, shareholderfocused brand of corporate governance, notwithstanding its substantial
reputational risks. 45 Hitherto, the traditional governance paradigm of
multinational corporations rigidly stressed shareholder profit maximization. 46 Essentially, in an effort to reach narrowly defined goals in the
form of financial targets, many transnational firms failed to consider how
backlash from public perceptions of raw corporate greed could affect
business.47 Instead, leading and aspiring multinational corporations traversed the globe seeking locations that offered low labor costs and lax
environmental and socioeconomic regulations.48
With the advent of the 1990s came a succession of ecological crises
stemming from morally questionable business practices. This propelled
1977 the International Labour Organization (ILO) adopted its Tripartite Declaration of
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises, calling upon businesses to voluntarily
comply with ILO conventions and recommendations. See Int’l Labour Organization
[ILO], Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and
Social Policy, 17 I.L.M. 422, para. 6 (1977).
42. Arlene I. Broadhurst, Corporations and the Ethics of Social Responsibility: An
Emerging Regime of Expansion and Compliance, 9 BUS. ETHICS: A EURO. REV. 86, 88
(2000).
43. Id.
44. Noteworthy examples are the Bhopal disaster involving leakage of deadly MIC
gas from one of Union Carbide’s industrial plants, and the widespread calls for disinvestment of U.S.-based multinationals from apartheid South Africa. See Cortelyou Kenney, Comment, Disaster in the Amazon: Dodging “Boomerang Suits” in Transnational
Human Rights Litigation, 97 CAL. L. REV. 857, 875 (2009); see also Kenneth A. Rodman,
Public and Private Sanctions Against South Africa, 109 POL. SCI. Q. 313, 320 (1994).
45. See European Commission Green Paper on Promoting a European Framework
for Corporate Responsibility, COM (2001) 366 final (July 18, 2001), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0366en01.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2009) [hereinafter EU Green Paper].
46. See generally Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to
Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970.
47. Debora Spar, The Spotlight and the Bottom Line, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.–Apr. 1998,
at 7–9.
48. See Morton Winston, NGO Strategies for Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility, 16 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 71, 72–73 (2002).

2010]

CORPORATE REPUTATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY

51

multinational corporations further into the spotlight. The Exxon Valdes
disaster in Prince William Sound and the Royal Dutch Shell controversy
over the disposal of the Brent Spar in the North Sea were two wellpublicized incidents that caused considerable damage to the reputations
of the firms involved. Royal Dutch Shell also suffered reputational damage over its apparent complicity with the execution of Ogoni indigenous
leaders in Nigeria, and Nike suffered significant backlash, especially between 1992 and 1997, when reports regarding the company’s operations
in Southeast Asia spawned public concern over child labor and poor
working conditions in “sweatshops.”49
As a result of these public controversies, corporations began guarding
their reputations while global civil society began questioning the unregulated market dominance of transnational firms.50 Such unbridled control
was exacerbating social inequalities and human rights violations while
endangering the earth’s ecological systems and depleting natural resources.51
Seeking institutional authority to voice its position, global civil society
condemned multinational corporations collectively for failure to provide
proper employment conditions and decent wages, and for failure to foster
human rights as mandated by the United Nations Declarations and International Labor Organization Conventions and Recommendations.52 With
respect to ecology, civil society began to insist that firms comply with
United Nations’ agreements and conventions on development and the
environment.53 Furthermore, pressured by civil society, firms began to
recognize state-sanctioned environmental regulations promulgated by
regional organizations, such as the European Commission.54
Consequently, in the latter part of the 1990s, many firms began advocating the notion that responsible corporate conduct produces mid- to
long-term financial rewards.55 This idea stood in opposition to the long49. See U.N. Res. Inst. For Soc. Dev., Business Responsibility for Sustainable Development Project, Working Paper: Barricades and Boardrooms: a Contemporary History
of the Corporate Accountability Movement, 32–34 (2004) (prepared by Jem Bendell)
[hereinafter Barricades and Boardrooms]; DEBORA L. SPAR & JENNIFER BURNS, HITTING
THE WALL: NIKE AND INTERNATIONAL LABOR PRACTICES Harvard Business School case
700-047 7–9 (rev. 2002).
50. Ngaire Woods, Global Governance and Role of Institutions, in GOVERNING
GLOBALIZATION 25, 32 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2002).
51. See Winston, supra note 48, at 72–73.
52. Barricades and Boardrooms, supra note 49, at 14–16.
53. Winston, supra note 48, at 72–73.
54. Scholte, supra note 20, at 15.
55. See generally John G. Ruggie, Reconstituting the Global Public Domain: Issues,
Actors and Practices, 10 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 499, 499–504 (2004).
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held notion that corporate wealth is solely grounded in maximization of
profits for stockholders.56 Firms that were clinging to the conventional
viewpoint were equally opposed to the advent of CSR because they
believed it entailed significant financial costs.57 To this day, the international business community remains at odds over these divergent
perspectives. Nevertheless, several features of CSR have gained prominence, including:
 Adoption of voluntary initiatives aimed at elevating the ethical
level of operations above that which is required by law;
 Internalization of externalities;
 Consideration of a range of stakeholder interests;
 Integration of the firm’s social and economic mandates;
 Contributions to nonprofit, charitable, and other civic organizations and causes;
 Provision of employee benefits and improvement of quality of
life in the workplace.58
B. Social Responsibility, Responsiveness, and Performance Distinguished
Scholars have crafted a distinction between CSR, which stresses obligations and accountability, and “corporate social responsiveness,” which
emphasizes action and activity.59 But beyond these distinctions, there is a
third, results-oriented concept known as “corporate social performance.”
Below, I will explain all three perspectives on social-awareness.
1. Corporate Social Responsibility
Some say it is futile to attempt an operational definition of CSR because there are too many conceivable applications of CSR.60 But, broadly
stated, CSR merely implies that businesses share responsibility for
societal conditions. Archie Carroll separates business obligations into

56. Friedman, supra note 46, at 32.
57. Winston, supra note 48, at 85.
58. See generally CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: READING AND CASES IN
GLOBAL CONTEXT, supra note 25, at 1.
59. See William C. Frederick, From CSR-1 to CSR-2: The Maturing of Business-andSociety Thought, 33 BUS. & SOC’Y 150, 150–54 (1994) [hereinafter CSR-1 to CSR-2]; see
also Barry M. Mitnick, Systematics and CSR: The Theory and Processes of Normative
Referencing, 34 BUS. & SOC’Y 5, 6 (1995).
60. See Edwin M. Epstein, The Corporate Social Policy Process and the Process of
Corporate Governance, 25 AM. BUS. L.J. 361, 374 (1987).
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four classes: economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary.61 A firm has an
economic responsibility to provide goods and services, offer employment
at a living wage, and generate profits to survive.62 Through these obligations, firms enhance societal well-being. Similarly, corporations shoulder
legal responsibilities imposed by courts, legislatures, and administrative
agencies. 63 These responsibilities can assume many forms and may
extend to consumers, employees, stockholders, suppliers, and other
stakeholders.64
In addition, CSR signifies conformity to society’s expectations of
appropriate business behavior such as honoring unwritten ethical standards.65 For example, while corporations are not legally bound to contribute to charities, many citizens expect profitable enterprises to do so.66
Moreover, as law sometimes lags behind social norms, some of society’s
normative expectations may eventually evolve into law.67 Lastly, some of
society’s expectations are not clearly defined for corporations.68 For instance, although society might expect corporations to invest in efforts to
resolve significant social problems, society does not have a clear idea of
what shape or form those solutions might take.69

61. See Archie B. Carroll, A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate
Social Performance, 4 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 497, 503 (1979).
62. Peter Drucker elaborates this point of view as follows:
Economic performance is the first responsibility of business. A business that
does not show a profit at least equal to its cost of capital is socially irresponsible. It wastes society’s resources. Economic performance is the basis; without
it, a business cannot discharge any other responsibilities, cannot be a good employer, a good citizen, a good neighbor. But economic performance is not the
sole responsibility of business.
PETER F. DRUCKER, POST-CAPITALIST SOCIETY 101 (1993).
63. See generally JOHN R. BOATRIGHT, ETHICS AND THE CONDUCT OF BUSINESS 1 (4th
ed. 2003).
64. For instance, legal responsibilities imposed by FDA, FTC, OSHA, CPSC, EPA,
EEOC, and SEC regulations, to name but a handful from the morass of U.S. regulatory
agencies. See id. at 111, 210, 264, 272, 306–11, 339.
65. See id. at 369.
66. See Carroll, supra note 61, at 500.
67. See id. at 502–04.
68. See id. at 500.
69. See id. at 500.
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2. Corporate Social Responsiveness
Robert Ackerman and Raymond Bauer claim that the term “social responsiveness” is a label more apt for a process-focused social outlook.70
Ackerman and Bauer have argued that emphasizing companies’ obligations places too much importance on motivation rather than on performance.71 In their words, “Responding to social demands is much more
than deciding what to do. There remains the management task of doing
what one has decided to do, and this task is far from trivial.”72 Focus on
responsiveness allows companies to fulfill social responsibilities without
being distracted by issues of accountability that arise when organizations
attempt, prior to acting, to determine their precise responsibilities. 73
Social responsiveness addresses a firm’s ability to be alert to social pressures.74 Thus, rather than simply reacting to a crisis, the socially responsive firm would have preempted the crisis by implementing a process
enabling it to foresee predicaments and be proactive in a productive and
humanitarian manner.75
3. Corporate Social Performance (“CSP”)
Under the “performance” viewpoint, it is firms’ capabilities that are
paramount.76 In other words, once a firm accepts that it has a “social responsibility” and adopts a responsiveness mentality, it is the results
achieved thereafter that are critical. Constructing a CSP framework requires more than a determination of the nature of the responsibility.77 It
also involves articulating certain philosophies, patterns, modes, or strategies of responsiveness.78 Carroll has designed a CSP model around three
key facets: (1) social responsibility categories—economic, legal, ethical,
and discretionary; (2) philosophies (or modes) of social responsiveness—
reaction, defense, accommodation, and pro-action; and (3) social (or

70. See ROBERT ACKERMAN & RAYMOND BAUER, CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIVENESS: THE MODERN DILEMMA 6–7 (1976).
71. See id. at 6.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See CSR-1 to CSR-2, supra note 59, at 154; see also Edwin M. Epstein, The Corporate Social Policy Process: Beyond Business Ethics, Corporate Social Responsibility
and Corporate Social Responsiveness, 29 CAL. MGMT. REV. 99, 104 (1987).
75. BOATRIGHT, supra note 63, at 370 (discussing the difference between responsibility and responsiveness).
76. See Carroll, supra note 61, at 502, 504 (explaining the use of the social performance
model to guide managerial actions in responding to a range of business obligations).
77. See id. at 500 (illustrating an elaborate framework of the “social issues involved”).
78. See id. at 501.
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stakeholder) issues involved—consumer issues, environmental issues,
and employee issues.79 This configuration illustrates that corporate social
responsibility is not separate from financial performance. Moreover, it
places ethical and philanthropic expectations into a rational, economic,
and legal structure.80
C. Corporate Social Responsibility and Global Governance
As the preceding discussion suggests, the emergence of CSR81 poses a
challenge to a corporate governance framework centered on shareholder
value creation. 82 The rise of CSR has engendered a debate about the
ultimate purpose and essential nature of a business corporation. 83 The
competing visions expose conflicting political and moral preferences
regarding the corporation’s nature.84 In the same vein, scholars sympathetic to CSR argue that both the contractual model of the firm, where
the corporation is seen as a “nexus of contracts,”85 and the legal person
model, where a corporation has a distinct legal personality, 86 do not
establish a basis for conferring superior property rights to shareholders
over employees.87 It is argued instead that employees contributing labor

79. See id. at 502–04; Archie B. Carroll, The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders, BUS. HORIZONS,
July–Aug. 1991, at 42.
80. See sources cited supra note 79.
81. Hereafter “CSR” is used to designate corporate social responsibility, corporate
social responsiveness and corporate performance collectively.
82. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form:
A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767,
767 (2005); cf. Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1587 (1993) (arguing that the “policies underlying corporate
law cannot be reduced to a unidimensional value, such as the economic objective of
‘maximizing shareholders’ wealth.”).
83. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 82, at 768–70 (delineating the parameters of the
debate about the broader role of the corporations).
84. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264 (1992).
85. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation is a Nexus of
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 825–26 (1999); Michael
Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP.
L. 779, 782–84 (2006); see also JOHN R. BOATRIGHT, ETHICS IN FINANCE 176, 193 (1999).
86. David S. Allen, The First Amendment and the Doctrine of Corporate Personhood: Collapsing the Press-Corporation Distinction, 2 JOURNALISM 255, 259–260
(2001).
87. See Eisenberg, supra note 85, at 825; Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in
Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 294 (1998).
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to the firm are entitled to legal recognition of their residual interest in the
assets of the enterprise.88
In addition, CSR advocates challenge narrow economics-based justifications for the stockholder-centered view, asserting that the ideal of corporate efficiency carries a broader meaning than elevated stock prices.89
Accordingly, CSR-oriented theorists have generally repudiated the type
of cost-benefit analysis that ignores and segregates distributive considerations from conventional notions of profit-maximizing efficiency. 90
Because a corporation’s existence depends on sophisticated financial
transactions, contracts, managers, employees, and other relationships
among investors, it functions as a semi-public enterprise.91 However, this
view is not universally shared among corporate governance scholars.92
Consequently, CSR’s main tenets have highlighted corporate stakeholders’ interests. They have recognized that firms’ constituencies play
similarly active roles in corporate conduct and strategy. 93 Moreover,
88. E.g., Greenfield, supra note 87, at 304. Scholarly commentary has also focused
on the property rights justifications for the notion of the shareholder primacy. See Oliver
Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119,
1119 (1990). See generally Allen, supra note 84, at 270.
89. See generally Kent Greenfield, There’s a Forest in Those Trees: Teaching About
the Role of Corporations in Society, 34 GA. L. REV. 1011, 1011 (2000); Ronen Shamir,
The Age of Responsibilization: On Market-Embedded Morality, 37 ECON. & SOC’Y 1, 1
(2008).
90. See generally Kent Greenfield, New Principles for Corporate Law, 1 HASTINGS
BUS. L.J. 87, 117 (2005); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework
for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 590 (1992).
91. See KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS
AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 29 (2006). See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 247 (1999)
(building upon the presumption that corporate managers owe a duty beyond that which
they owe to the shareholders).
92. For example, corporate law professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman
argue that “the recent dominance of a shareholder-centered ideology of corporate law
among the business, government, and legal elites in key commercial jurisdictions” has
left no serious contenders to this view of a corporation. Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001); see
also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence
in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 650 (1999); Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function,
49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 333 (2001). For a critique of Hansmann’s and Kraakman’s position decrying their perspective as “Americanocentric,” see Douglas M. Branson, The
Very Uncertain Prospect of “Global” Convergence in Corporate Governance, 34
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 321, 331 (2001).
93. See FREEMAN, supra note 29, at 24–25. See generally Thomas Donaldson & Lee
E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 65, 65–66 (1995).
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recent scholarly literature illustrates that conventional approaches to corporate governance are changing due to concerns facing management of
multinational firms.94 These changes have led to economic analysis of
managerial incentives for undertaking corporate social responsibility,95
fiduciary duties, 96 stakeholder-oriented management strategies, 97 and
pro-CSR activism by corporate boards and their shareholders.98 The inquiry also highlights quantitative metrics of ratings, reporting practices,
and indexes that relate to corporate responsibility governance.99 In addition, new methods have been suggested for allowing enhanced participation on the part of boards of directors.100 Greater inclusion on a board
will foster a stronger connection between corporate accountability and
governance.101

94. See, e.g., Michael Bradley, Cindy A. Schipani, Anant K. Sundaram, & James P.
Walsh, The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society:
Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1999, at 9, 9.
95. See generally Craig Mackenzie, Boards, Incentives and Corporate Social
Responsibility: The Case for a Change of Emphasis, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV.
935, 935 (2007).
96. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers are
Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1600–01 (2005).
97. See Bradley, Schipani, Sundaram, & Walsh, supra note 94, at 28–29; see also
Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and Corporate
Governance at the End of History, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2004, at 109, 110.
98. See, e.g., Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of “Corporate Democracy”:
Shareholder Voice and Management Composition, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 735, 754
(2003); see also Adam J. Sulkowski & Kent Greenfield, A Bridle, a Prod and a Big Stick:
An Evaluation of Class Actions, Shareholder Proposals and the Ultra Vires Doctrine as
Methods for Controlling Corporate Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 929, 938 (2005).
99. See Craig Deegan, The Legitimizing Effect of Social and Environmental Disclosures: A Theoretical Foundation, 15 ACCT. AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 282, 283–86
(2002); see also Reggy Hooghiemstra, Corporate Communication and Impression Management: New Perspectives Why Companies Engage in Social Reporting, 27 J. BUS.
ETHICS 55, 55 (2000); Ans Kolk, Sustainability, Accountability and Corporate Governance: Exploring Multinationals’ Reporting Practices, 18 BUS. STRATEGY & ENV’T. 1, 3
(2008).
100. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Board as a Path Toward Corporate
Social Responsibility, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 279, 302 (Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu & Tom
Campbell eds., 2007) (proposing several remedial measures).
101. See Arthur R. Pinto, Globalization and the Study of Comparative Corporate
Governance, 23 WIS. INT’L L.J. 477, 479 (2005). See generally YADONG LUO, GLOBAL
DIMENSIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 131 (2007).
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II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GLOBALLY
From the standpoint of global corporate governance, the discussion
regarding corporate social responsibility, corporate social responsiveness, and corporate social performance is reduced to a debate about what
may be termed a monophonic versus a polyphonic102 view of corporate
objectives. For years, assuming various labels, the debate between the
monophonic and polyphonic camps has encompassed business ethics,
management, corporate law, and corporate governance theories.103 The
debate has focused predominately on the behavior of domestic, rather
than multinational, business enterprises.104 It has thus centered on interpretations of domestic corporate law (e.g., U.S. corporate law).105 As the
following discussion demonstrates, the monophonic-polyphonic controversy—either in a local or global context—aims to explain what form of
governance would fulfill the obligations of corporate social responsibility
while moving beyond the narrow goal of shareholder wealth maximization.106
102. The author uses the terms by way of analogy to music. In musical composition,
polyphony (derived from the Greek words for “many” and “voice”) refers to a texture
made up of two or more independent melodic voices. By contrast, monophony refers to
music composed with only a single voice. BARBARA RUSSANO HANNING, CONCISE
HISTORY OF WESTERN MUSIC 44 (1st ed. 1998). Accordingly, a monophonic orientation in
global corporate governance is characterized by its concern for the single voice of shareholders, while a polyphonic orientation seeks to orchestrate a plurality of stakeholder
voices.
103. Depending on disciplinary context, the various designations have included:
“communitarian versus contractarian,” “Berle versus Dodd debate,” “shareholder paradox,” “separation fallacy,” “separation thesis,” and “monotonic versus pluralist” and
“unidimensional versus multidimensional.”
104. But see Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, Corporate Governance in a Global
Environment: A Search for the Best of all Worlds, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 829, 838–
42 (2000) (arguing that differing corporate governance structures in Europe, Japan, and
the United States restrict the extent to which transnational firms may permit stakeholder
influences).
105. Curiously, the same conflict is embodied in the Company Law of the People’s
Republic of China, which sets out a legal framework for the organization and operation
of private stock enterprises. See Michael Irl Nikkel, Note, “Chinese Characteristics” in
Corporate Clothing: Questions of Fiduciary Duty in China’s Company Law, 80 MINN. L.
REV. 503, 523 (1995) (Whereas Article 102 states that shareholders “shall be the organ of
authority” of the firm, Article 14 maintains that business enterprises must “strengthen the
establishment of a socialist spiritual civilization, and accept the supervision of the government and the public.”).
106. See Orts, supra note 82, at 1587. See generally William W. Bratton, Jr., The
“Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 407
(1989); Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409, 1409 (1993); Lyman Johnson, The
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A. Monophonic Governance Model
Over the years, the debate over the nature and purpose of the corporate
enterprise has lingered and has sought to apportion priority between
shareholder and nonshareholder interests. 107 In the United States, the
debate extends back to the landmark case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, 108 where the court held that a business corporation is organized
primarily for the profit of its stockholders, rather than for its employees
or the community. 109 The debate then poured into academia. Whereas
Adolf Berle advocated the stockholder-centric view, E. Merrick Dodd
urged increased consideration for nonstockholders.110
For a considerable time, the prevailing corporate governance paradigm
was dominated by the monophonic perspective, which emphasizes the
stockholder-centric approach to corporate governance.111 Consequently,

Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L.
REV. 865, 865 (1990); David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223,
223 (1991); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 210 (1990);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique
of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 856 (1997)
(reviewing PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995)).
107. See Judd F. Sneirson, Doing Well by Doing Good: Leveraging Due Care for Better, More Socially Responsible Corporate DecisionMaking, 3 CORP. GOVERNANCE L.
REV. 438, 439–40 (2007).
108. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
109. Id. The Dodge Court reasoned:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of
the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.
The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain
that end and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of
profits or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.
Id. Later, the debate resurfaced in the context of corporate mergers and acquisitions during the 1980s. The Delaware Supreme Court held that the interests of non-shareholders
could be taken into account by managers and directors when assessing the implications of
the takeover bids. Cf. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del.
1985) (finding a duty to evaluate the threat to the corporate enterprise as a whole).
110. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 1365, 1365–66 (1932); see also Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers
in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are
Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1145–53 (1932); A. A. Sommer,
Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years
Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 36–38 (1991); C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of
Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 77–89, 89 n.4 (2002).
111. See BOATRIGHT, supra note 85, at 194.
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corporate governance was focused mainly on the board’s structure, its
functions, and its relations with other corporate organs, and the emphasis
was on profit maximization.112 This governance model was heavily influenced by both Berle’s and Means’s analyses of principal-agent problems
arising from separating stockholders’ ownership rights from corporate
managerial duties.113 The business community relies on corporate law to
influence management so as to reduce such agency-cost problems. 114
This enables shareholders to trust managers with their investments. 115
With an emphasis on resolving agency conflicts, the monophonic corporate governance paradigm embraced a view of economic efficiency 116
that favored cost-benefit analysis and value-maximization objectives in
business decision-making.117 But it typically ignored adverse social and
environmental externalities, downplayed the stakeholders’ interests, 118
and disregarded firms’ obligations to nonshareholders.119
Milton Friedman advocated an extreme version of the monophonic
view for promoting a free-market economy:
In such an economy, there is one and only one social responsibility of
business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which

112. Id. at 172.
113. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 125–26 (rev. ed. 1967).
114. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH 21, 21 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2004).
115. See id.
116. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976); see
also Steven M.H. Wallman, Understanding the Purpose of a Corporation: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 807, 808–09 (1999); cf. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy
Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 279 (1998).
117. See Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership:
Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155, 1155–56 (1985); see also FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
4–5, 17, 38, 70 (1991).
118. See LYNNE L. DALLAS, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: A SOCIOECONOMIC APPROACH
483 (2005).
119. See Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Shareholders, Nonshareholders and
Corporate Law: Communitarianism and Resource Allocation, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393,
398 (1993); see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 117, at 70. See generally
Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A
Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1423–25 (1993).
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is to say, engages in open and free competition, without deception or
fraud.120

This view emphasizes competition to maximize the bottom line. This
approach, called the “separation thesis” by some, is antithetic to the view
that economic value may flow from a firm’s commitment to social responsibility. 121 Business managers view economics and ethics as two
mutually exclusive spheres.122 From the monophonic standpoint, “social
responsibility” possesses three key defects. First, it expresses a fundamental misunderstanding of the essence of a free market.123 Second, it
mistakenly allows the interests of groups other than shareholders to
constrain, rather than expand, corporate activities.124 Third, it does not
provide evidence of any economic benefits from investing in social initiatives.125 This position suggests a single argument for legal and ethical
compliance; namely, to sidestep the monetary costs of noncompliance.126
Accordingly, the monophonic view of corporate governance leads to
reactive compliance with environmental and human rights standards but
only insofar as these norms are grounded in the “hard” rule of law.127
That is, under the monophonic view, corporations comply only when
noncompliance threatens sanctions pursuant to the “hard” rule of law.
The monophonic view is hardwired to legal accountability (legal norms

120. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, at 133; see also Willa Johnson, Freedom and
Philanthropy: An Interview with Milton Friedman, 71 BUS. & SOC. REV. 11, 14 (1989).
Friedman also offered this decidedly monophonic account of corporate governance:
In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is an employee of the owners of the business. He has direct responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with their
desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those
embodied in ethical custom.
Friedman, supra note 46, at 32.
121. R. Edward Freeman, The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future Directions,
4 BUS. ETHICS Q. 409, 412 (1994).
122. See JACKSON, supra note 31, at 87; Kevin T. Jackson, A New Mindset for Business
Education: Cultivating Reputational Capital, in RETHINKING BUSINESS MANAGEMENT
149, 150 (Samuel Gregg and James Stoner, Jr. eds., 2d ed. 2008).
123. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, at 133 (arguing that a corporation’s social responsibility is to “increase profits”).
124. See id. at 133 (implying that social responsibility is distracting and restrains
corporate activity).
125. Cf. id. at 133–36.
126. See Jackson, supra note 122, at 149, 150.
127. Jackson, supra note 16, at 448.
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backed by hard sanctions) and fiscal accountability to stockholders, insofar as this is mandated by corporate law.128
B. Polyphonic Governance Model
Whereas the monophonic model is addressed to matters of agency, the
polyphonic model focuses on ethics and accountability to parties outside
the firm. 129 Under the polyphonic approach, maximizing profits for
shareholders is not the sole purpose of a business.130 Polyphonic corporate governance seeks to link relationships among various parties together
with a broadly defined corporate mission.131 This model sees businesses as
fulfilling various functions within a society.132 Here, businesses serve an
array of other constituents.133 Thus, the scope of social responsibility extends beyond merely meeting the bottom line, and business firms’ ethical
and discretionary responsibilities go beyond their purely economic and
legal objectives.134 Nevertheless, the monophonic view retains the basic
assumption that corporations are fundamentally profit-making enterprises.135 Corporations strive to meet the bottom line as it is necessary to
preserve their economic viability. They are not social welfare agencies.
Stated differently, managers have an institutional and moral duty to
broader constituencies to keep the firm profitable. Norman Bowie writes,
“[N]ot only does Wall Street expect a business rationale for corporate
good deeds; Wall Street has a moral right to those expectations.” 136
Bowie continues, “This strategy grounds the motive to seek profits in
ethics itself.”137 The polyphonic view, however, correctly assumes that,
128. Id.
129. See CARROLL & BUCHHOLTZ, supra note 29, at 83–85 (discussing the notion of a
stakeholder, and what is at stake for stakeholders or those outside of the firm).
130. See id.
131. See generally Josep M. Lozano, Towards the Relational Corporation: From
Managing Stakeholder Relationships to Building Stakeholder Relationships (Waiting for
Copernicus), 5(2) CORP. GOVERNANCE 60, 60 (2005) (discussing relations among stakeholders and shareholders).
132. Cf. Millon, supra note 106, at 225. See generally BOATRIGHT, supra note 63, at 1.
133. These constituencies include employees, customers, bondholders, suppliers, distributors, lenders, creditors, regulators, local communities, state and federal governments,
special interest groups, the environment, the communities in which the firm operates. See
FREEMAN, supra note 29, at 25; see also Goodpaster, supra note 29, at 54; McDaniel,
supra note 29, at 123; David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in
Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1378–79 (1993).
134. See CARROLL & BUCHHOLTZ, supra note 29, at 87 (providing a graphical illustration
of stakeholder view of the firm).
135. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 116, at 310.
136. See NORMAN E. BOWIE, BUSINESS ETHICS: A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE 142 (1999).
137. See id. at 142.
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even in pursuit of profit, corporations must deploy financial, political,
and social capital in a socially responsible way. Corporate governance
must seek to confer not only financial benefits to shareholders, but also
social benefits to all of the firm’s stakeholders.138
The monophonic perspective, which has been characterized as “corporate Neanderthalism,”139 fails to account for the fact that, in today’s information age, corporations are under meticulous observation.140 It fails
to consider that a watchful public, media, and government will hold multinational corporations accountable for “corporate Neanderthalism”; it
ignores firms’ broader social responsibilities; and it ignores the potential
for firms to incur “ethical blowback” 141 from broader constituencies.
Robert Solomon, for example, attacks the monophonic model for its “pathetic understanding of stockholder personality as homo economicus.”142
Whereas Amartya Sen challenges the mindset according to which “business principles are taken to be very rudimentary . . . essentially restricted
. . . to profit maximization, but with a very wide reach [to] . . . all economic transactions.”143
Before turning to the question of whether a polyphonic approach to
corporate governance provides a satisfactory theoretical anchoring for
the emerging regime of civil regulations that increasingly characterizes
global governance, it will be useful to examine an additional approach,
known as “integrative social contracts theory.”
C. Integrative Social Contracts Theory (“ISCT”)
Both corporate social responsiveness and the stakeholder view alike
are criticized on the ground that they do not provide management with
precise standards of conduct.144 By itself, the concept of corporate social
responsiveness falls short of offering normative guidelines for managers

138. See BOATRIGHT, supra note 63, at 385 (setting forth the stakeholder theory).
139. DONALDSON, supra note 5, at 45.
140. Ross, supra note 32, at 7–8; Spar, supra note 47, at 7–9.
141. See Thomas Donaldson, “Ethical Blowback”: The Missing Piece in the Corporate Governance Puzzle—The Risks to a Company Which Fails to Understand and
Respect Its Social Contract, 7 CORP. GOVERNANCE 534, 536 (2007).
142. See ROBERT C. SOLOMON, ETHICS AND EXCELLENCE: COOPERATION AND
INTEGRITY IN BUSINESS 45 (1992).
143. See Amartya Sen, Economics, Business Principles, and Moral Sentiments, 7 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 5, 5 (1997). “In contrast, moral sentiments are seen to be quite complex
(involving different types of ethical systems), but it is assumed, that at least in economic
matters, they have a very narrow reach (indeed, it is often presumed that such sentiments
have no real influence on economic behavior).” Id.
144. See BOATRIGHT, supra note 63, at 368; see also DONALDSON, supra note 5, at 45.
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to pursue in response to social expectations and demands.145 Likewise,
stakeholder theory has been faulted for its failure to reconcile the competing interests of various stakeholders.146
In response to these challenges, Thomas Donaldson and Thomas Dunfee developed a social contract theory of business.147 The ISCT develops
two key concepts: hypernorms and moral free space.148 These concepts
are illustrated by a reference to a series of concentric rings that represent
core norms accepted by corporations, industries, or economic cultures.149
Hypernorms, which rest at the center, are norms embodying transcultural
values fundamental to human existence, such as prescriptions shared by
main religions around the world and most basic human rights.150 Such
higher-order norms impose minimal necessary constraints on the capacity
of communities to formulate their own rules.151 Advancing away from
the center of the rings, one finds norms which have greater cultural specificity than those at the center.152 These rules are molded by the social
norms of sundry economic communities, such as corporations, subunits

145. See BOATRIGHT, supra note 63, at 370 (noting that CSR requires “responsiveness”); R. EDWARD FREEMAN & DANIEL R. GILBERT, JR., CORPORATE STRATEGY AND THE
SEARCH FOR ETHICS 104–05 (1988); CSR-1 to CSR-2, supra note 59, at 152; Mitnick,
supra note 59, at 6.
146. DONALDSON, supra note 5, at 45–46. Thomas Donaldson writes that “[d]espite its
important insights, the stakeholder model has serious problems. The two most obvious
are its inability to provide standards for assigning relative weights to the interests of the
various constituencies, and its failure to contain within itself, or make references to, a
normative justificatory foundation.” Id.; see also Thomas W. Dunfee & Thomas Donaldson, Contractarian Business Ethics: Current Status and Next Steps, 5 BUS. ETHICS Q.
173, 175 (1995). The stakeholder model has also been challenged on the ground that it
does not provide sufficiently rigorous criteria for settling disputes about who or what
qualifies as a legitimate stakeholder, as in the case of child laborers working for a multinational corporation’s supplier when the firm is in the process of a merger with another
multinational firm. See Bert van de Ven, Human Rights as a Normative Basis for Stakeholder Legitimacy, 5(2) CORP. GOVERNANCE 48, 55–56 (2005).
147. See DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note 12, at 235–36; Thomas Donaldson &
Thomas W. Dunfee, Integrative Social Contracts Theory: A Communitarian Conception
of Economic Ethics, 11 ECON. & PHIL. 85, 85–86 (1995); see also Thomas Donaldson &
Thomas W. Dunfee, Toward a Unified Conception of Business Ethics: Integrative Social
Contracts Theory, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 252, 252 (1994) [hereinafter Toward a Unified
Conception].
148. DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note 12, at 222.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 74–81.
151. See id. at 49–52.
152. Id. at 222.

2010]

CORPORATE REPUTATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY

65

within firms, industries, professional associations, trade groups, governmental bodies, and so on.153
The next ring represents moral free space, where one finds norms that
are inconsistent with at least some other norms embraced by other
economic communities.154 Within moral free space, members are free to
establish their own norms for economic conduct. 155 However, such
norms must have the status of being both “authentic” and “legitimate.”156
A norm is “authentic” if community members have given their informed
consent to the norm’s existence while still retaining a right to exit the
community should they come to disapprove of the norm.157 The existence
of specific authentic norms is established by empirical conditions expressing customary acceptance by the relevant economic community.158
A norm is “legitimate” if it does not run afoul of a hypernorm.159 At
the outermost ring are illegitimate norms, which are incompatible with
hypernorms. Donaldson and Dunfee assert that integrative social contracts theory provides a normative core for stakeholder theory.160 Following this line of thought entails consulting relevant community norms to
decide, first, who counts as a stakeholder, and, second, what obligations
extend from the firm to the stakeholders.161 Conflicts between norms are
resolved by determining the dominant legitimate norms, which are
accorded priority.162
The preceding discussion shows the need for corporations to adapt to
societal expectations and adopt societal norms. While both CSR and
stakeholder theory advance the general notion that corporations should
be attuned to a variety of stakeholders’ demands, social contract theory
makes a significant contribution beyond those accounts. Social contract

153. Id. at 40.
154. Id. at 222.
155. Id. at 38.
156. Id. at 46.
157. Id. at 43.
158. Most members of community C approve of compliance with N in recurrent situation S, most members of C disapprove of deviance from N in S, a substantial percentage
(well over 50%) of members of C comply with N when facing S. See Toward a Unified
Conception, supra note 147, at 263–64.
159. Id. at 265.
160. Id. at 254.
161. See DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note 12, at 235–36.
162. Id. at 49. In circumstances lacking dominant or well-established norms, firms
remain in the area of moral free space. Id. at 85. It should be noted that, according to
ISCT, all of firms’ activities must comply with extant and applicable hypernorms. See
Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 147, at 89; see also Toward a Unified Conception,
supra note 147, at 268–69.
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theory accords deeper meaning and substance to the notion of CSR by
fastening it to communal norms. 163 The social contract perspective on
corporate governance provides an explanation for corporations’ acceptance of global civil regulations.164 These regulations, as understood in
ISCT’s terminology, are “extant social contracts”—the product of economic communities voluntarily adopting norms within moral free
space.165 ISCT highlights the normative content of the standards necessary for adopting moral principles. Without definite content—i.e., without a definite mission for corporate governance—stakeholders would
engage in power-wars over their respective interests.166 CSR scholars and
ethicists, for instance, consider the human rights and environmental
norms that are voluntary established by multinational firms to incorporate
genuine moral obligations that are recognized by worldwide consensus.167 Accordingly, ISCT’s notion of hypernorms accounts substantially
for the emergence of global civil regulations in the form of “soft” and
“hard” law.
D. Corporate Reputational Capital: The Missing Link
Given its emphasis on the wider society, the rise of civil regulation
should lead corporate governance to embrace the polyphonic view. Paradoxically, however, its rise has not diminished the importance global
companies attach to the monophonic model. 168 Nevertheless, as many
global companies have discovered, there is evidence that commitment to
responsible global corporate citizenship comes with financial advantages.169 The rise of civil regulations, therefore, begs the question whether
corporate governance can effectively synchronize the monophonic and
polyphonic viewpoints. When corporate governance, in an effort to
163. See, for example, Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social
Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537, 546 (1998), and Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 338 (1997), for a discussion of the concept of social norms.
164. See generally DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note 12, at 25 (discussing social
contract and global civil regulations).
165. Thomas Dunfee, Challenges to Corporate Governance: Corporate Governance in
a Market with Morality, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1999, at 129, 145. See generally
Dunfee, supra note 23, at 23.
166. See DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note 12, at 97 (the graphic table sets out the
dynamics that occur in the “moral free space”).
167. See, e.g., Frederick, supra note 14, at 165.
168. BAKAN, supra note 3, at 27.
169. See S. Prakash Sethi & Linda M. Sama, Ethical Behavior as a Strategic Choice
by Large Corporations: The Interactive Effect of Marketplace Competition, Industry
Structure and Firm Resources, 1 BUS. ETHICS Q. 85, 95–98 (1998).
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stockpile reputational capital, begins to maximize shareholder wealth by
properly accommodating various stakeholders’ interests, synchronization
may be attained.170 In other words, reputational capital provides a missing link in global governance. The notion of reputational capital recognizes that the volume and breadth of social expectations are increasing.
The ISCT provides the theoretical foundation. When micro-social
contracts are breached, the breaches cause direct reputational harm and
diminish corporate “reputational assets.” 171 When the “contracts” are
“performed,” the firm’s reputational capital grows.172
The concept of reputational capital emerged in tandem with the ideal
of free-market capitalism, which has been modified with the advent of
civil society’s focus on CSR. 173 Reputational capital may prove to be
indispensible for modern corporate managers. It illuminates how managers should commit to CSR to preserve and build a firm’s intangible reputational assets.174 Managers’ commitment to CSR is further buttressed by
the emerging corpus of global civil regulations.175 Simply put, the “sanction” for noncompliance with civil standards translates into reputational
loss. The “reward” for honoring the standards is reputational gain.
Accordingly, the emerging “accountability regimes” sanction corporations for breaches of their CSR.
III. THE REGIME OF GLOBAL CIVIL REGULATIONS
I now turn to the emergence of a global governance regime that
primarily stands for civil business regulation, or “soft law.” Civil regulations utilize private, nonstate, and market-based regulatory regimes to

170. See Goodpaster, supra note 29, at 57–58.
171. See Donaldson, supra note 141, at 534–36.
172. The author defines “reputational capital” as a firm’s intangible long-term strategic
assets calculated to generate profits. The reputational capital of a corporation is a hybrid
of economic values and moral values. See GRAHAME DOWLING, CREATING CORPORATE
REPUTATIONS: IDENTITY, IMAGE, AND PERFORMANCE 23 (2001); see also CHARLES J.
FOMBRUM & CEES B.M. VAN RIEL, FAME & FORTUNE: HOW SUCCESSFUL COMPANIES BUILD
WINNING REPUTATIONS 32–35 (2004) (discussing “perceptual and social assets”);
JACKSON, supra note 31, at 56; PAINE, supra note 17 (discussing numerous payoffs including increased market share, acquisition of ideas and talent, and diminished costs for
activities such as funding, marketing, and recruiting). See generally RONALD J. ALSOP,
THE 18 IMMUTABLE LAWS OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 17 (2004); CHARLES J. FOMBRUN,
REPUTATION: REALIZING VALUE FROM THE CORPORATE IMAGE 1 (1996).
173. See JACKSON, supra note 31, at 25–35.
174. Ross, supra note 32, at 8.
175. See Edwin Epstein, Commentary, The Good Company: Rhetoric or Reality? Corporate Social Responsibility and Business Ethics Redux, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 207, 214, 219
(2007).
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govern multinational enterprises and their global supply networks. 176
They regulate the impact multinational companies and markets have on
human rights practices, labor conditions, environmental sustainability,
and community development, particularly in less developed countries.177
In the past, businesses and their leaders sought to cure social ills at the
local level through philanthropic initiatives.178 Unlike local community
philanthropy, however, CSR has become increasingly transnational in its
reach due to the social contract for multinational business.179
A. Background on Civil Regulations
Along with the growth of CSR, a surge of public interest advocacy,
spearheaded by nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) and regulators, calls for the introduction of enforceable instruments to support supervision of social responsibility and corporate accountability.180 Among
the mechanisms to be employed are public monitoring campaigns and
litigation targeting multinational enterprises over human rights and
workplace violations, as well as promulgation of “soft” law norms. 181
The goal is to increase businesses’ involvement with CSR. 182 To that
aim, civil society groups step in to pressure businesses and hold them
accountable.183

176. See generally David Vogel, Private Global Business Regulation, 11 ANN. REV.
POL. SCI. 261, 265–68. (2008) (discussing various aspects of civil regulation).
177. See id. at 262.
178. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BREMNER, AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY 45, 123 (1st ed. 1960)
(noting that philanthropy occurred on the local, community level).
179. See DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note 12, at 15 (discussing the European social
contract).
180. Jonathan P. Doh & Terrence R. Guay, Corporate Social Responsibility, Public
Policy, and NGO Activism in Europe and the United States: An Institutional-Stakeholder
Perspective, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 47, 47 (2006).
181. See Christine Parker, Meta-Regulation: Legal Accountability to Corporate Social
Responsibility, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 207, 216–17 (Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu &
Tom Campbell eds., 2007) (proposing several remedial measures); see also Bronwen
Morgan, The Economization of Politics: Meta-Regulation as a Form of Nonjudicial
Legality, 12 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 489, 517 (2003). See generally BRAITHWAITE &
DRAHOS, supra note 24, at 1 (providing a superb illustration of individual regulatory mechanism across various industry sectors); RONNIE D. LIPSCHUTZ & JAMES K. ROWE,
GLOBALIZATION, GOVERNMENTALITY AND GLOBAL POLITICS: REGULATION FOR THE REST
OF US? 76–78 (2005); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 543, 543 (2000) (discussing private mechanism in public governance).
182. See Parker, supra note 181, at 207, 215–16.
183. See generally Winston, supra note 48.
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Civil regulations differ from customary methods of business selfregulation in several ways. First, the regulations promote a variety of
public interests, not just the interests of companies or industries. 184
Second, unlike established modes of business self-regulation, civil regulations arise in reaction to the society’s expectations with respect to businesses. 185 Society’s expectations, in turn, are driven by activists who
expose corporations’ breaches of their CSR, or, in terms of the ISCT,
breaches of the “terms” of the social contract.186 Finally, unlike conventional business self-regulation, civil regulation is more apt to engage
nonbusiness constituents in processes that are pertinent to civil society.187
In sum, the regulations establish nonstate mechanisms for governing
transnational companies and markets.188
1. The Global Public Domain
The growth of global civil regulation serves as an interface between
multinational corporations and private governance. The rise of such regulation is connected to the emergence of a new global public domain.189
Comprised of both private and public participants, the global public domain is a forum for discussion, debate, and activism regarding the creation of “global public goods.”190 In the context of global environmental
and social responsibility, cooperation between multinationals and civil
society institutions presupposes delineation of the scope of those responsibilities.191 Many of the entities comprising the global public domain are
NGOs. 192 NGOs are mainly headquartered in North America and
184. See Vogel, supra note 176, at 263.
185. See id. at 262–63.
186. See generally Donaldson, supra note 141.
187. See Vogel, supra note 176, at 263.
188. Robert Falkner, Private Environmental Governance and International Relations:
Exploring the Links, GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., May 2003, at 72, 79.
189. See Ruggie, supra note 55, at 499–531.
190. See Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg & Marc A. Stern, Defining Global Public
Goods, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY
2, 14–15 (Isabel Grunberg, Inge Kaul & Marc Stern eds., 1999).
191. See id. 113–15; see also Ronnie D. Lipschutz, From Local Knowledge and Practice to Global Environmental Governance, in APPROACHES TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
THEORY 259, 261 (Martin Hewson & Timothy J. Sinclair eds., 1999).
192. NGOs are turning increasingly global, as illustrated by the fact that over 1,000 of
them have memberships comprised from three or more countries. See Shaughn McArthur,
Global Governance and the Rise of NGOs, ASIAN J. OF PUB. AFF. 54, 60 (2009). NGOs
are also becoming highly influential global agents. See id. Although a significant amount
of NGO efforts have been directed toward public institutions and policies, in recent years,
they have been seeking more and more to gain sway over practices of companies, industries, and markets as well. See Caroline Harper, Do the Facts Matter? NGOs, Research,
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Europe.193 They scrutinize and try to gain sway over an array of transnational business practices.194 There are, however, other actors in the global
public domain that exert influence on corporate accountability. Consumer organizations, environmental and sustainability groups, human rights
advocates, labor unions, religious affiliations, student associations, social
and ethical funds, and socially oriented institutional investors, are all part
of the global public domain.195
2. Scope and Magnitude of the Regulations
The quantity and span of global civil regulations grew substantially
throughout the 1990s. 196 Private regulations that specify standards for
responsible business conduct are in place for nearly all global industry
sectors and internationally traded products or services. 197 Currently,
and International Advocacy, in GLOBAL CITIZEN ACTION 247, 247 (Michael Edwards &
John Gaventa eds., 2001).
193. See Kal Raustiala, Note, The “Participatory Revolution” in International Environmental Law, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 537, 568 (1997); see also Sally Engle Merry,
Constructing a Global Law-Violence Against Women and the Human Rights System, 28
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 941, 972–73 (2003) (arguing that NGOs with the most influence
are mostly from North America and Europe).
194. Several prominent works have discuses the global civil society’s emergence and
its impact, as well as global citizen activism, including efforts to address corporate conduct. See generally GLOBAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 1 (Robin Cohen & Shirin Rai eds., 2000)
[hereinafter MOVEMENTS]; MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND
BORDERS 43–44, 89–103 (1998); MARJORIE MAYO, GLOBAL CITIZENS: SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS AND THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBALIZATION 31 (2005); SIDNEY TARROW, THE
NEW TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM 27 (2005); Peter Newell, Campaigning for Corporate
Change: Global Citizen Action on the Environment, in GLOBAL CITIZEN ACTION 189, 189
(Michael Edwards & John Gaventa eds., 2001).
195. An expansive body of scholarship has also examined the make-up of the global
public domain. See, e.g., SRILANTHA BATLIWALA & L. DAVID BROWN, TRANSNATIONAL
CIVIL SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION 1 (2006); TARROW, supra note 194, at 1 (2005);
MOVEMENTS, supra note 194 (defining global social movements).
196. See ZADEK, supra note 25, at 1; U.N. Res. Inst. For Soc. Dev., Business Responsibility for Sustainable Development Project, Working Paper: Corporate Codes of Conduct: Self-Regulation in a Global Economy 1 (2001) (prepared by Rhys Jenkins), [hereinafter Self-regulation In a Global Economy].
197. In excess of 2,300 transnational companies have approved the Business Charter
for Sustainable Development authored by the International Chamber of Commerce. See
The Global Development Research Center, ICC’s Business Charter for Sustainable
Development, http://www.gdrc.org/sustbiz/icc-charter.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2009).
Among them are apparel, athletic equipment, chemicals, coffee, cocoa, computers and
electronic equipment, diamonds and gold, energy, financial services, fisheries, forestry,
minerals and mining, palm oil, rugs, toys, and tourism. See Mathias Koenig-Archibugi,
Transnational Corporations and Public Accountability, 34 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 234,
234–35 (2004); Ans Kolk & Rob van Tulder, Setting New Global Rules? TNCs and
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approximately 300 products or industry codes are enacted.198 Many of
these codes speak to environmental or employment practices.199 Multiple
codes regulate a significant number of different products and sectors.200
Many companies periodically report their environmental and social practices.201 A large number of these companies have formulated their own
codes while also subscribing to additional industry and cross-industry
codes of conduct.202 For example, The United Nations Global Compact,
which is the biggest private business code, boasts over 3,500 corporate
signatories, spanning six continents. 203 The number of major global
financial institutions signing the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment more than doubled to reach 381 in 2008, representing
assets of $14 trillion.204
As previously noted, the growth of civil regulations has resulted from
civil society’s increased expectations for CSR. 205 Self-regulation and
voluntary compliance 206 have grown up within the global business
framework. 207 A variety of self-regulation tools are available to assist
Codes of Conduct, TRANSNAT’L CORPS., Dec. 2005, at 1, 1. See Michael Vandenbergh,
The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in Global Governance, 54
UCLA L. REV. 913, 913 (2007), for an overview of the efforts of individual companies
across various sectors in establishing networks of private contract to enhance environmental standards of their suppliers. See generally Self-regulation In a Global Economy,
supra note 196, at 1; Gary Gereffi, Ronie Garcia-Johnson & Erika Sasser, The NGOIndustrial Complex, FOREIGN POL’Y, July/Aug. 2001, at 56, 56.
198. Vogel, supra note 176, at 262.
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See generally U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT., CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP IN THE WORLD
ECONOMY (2008), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/
gc _brochure_final.pdf. Among them are BP, Cisco Systems, Daimler Benz, DeloitteTouche, DuPont, Hewlett-Packard, Novartis, Royal Dutch Shell, Unilever, and Volvo.
The Compact contains 10 principles that aim to advance human rights and worker rights,
protect the environment, and reduce corruption. Id. Firms wishing to join the Compact
submit a letter of intent from the CEO and consent to publish in annual reports or similar
communications an account of the ways they are lending support for the Compact. Id.
The objective is to merge principles of the Compact into a company’s business culture,
strategy, and day-to-day undertakings. Id.
204. Press Release, U.N. Global Compact, Principles for Sustainable Development
(June 17, 2005), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/newsandevents/news_
archives/2008_06_17a.html.
205. See generally Ruggie, supra note 55, at 499–531.
206. See ZADEK, supra note 25, at 122.
207. Voluntary compliance takes various forms, but they are mainly best practices,
codes of conduct, environmental and social management systems, performance standards,
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firms in their commitments to corporate social responsibility.208 As the
discussion below illustrates, these tools are used within the context of
accountability regimes, which are principally linked to the firms’ reputations. Thus in the context of reputational capital, the private sector is
equipped with instrument to manage and regulate business conduct. This
regulation seeks to reduce the degree of environmental and social risk
that firms’ actions otherwise cause.
B. Characteristics of Civil Regulations
Unlike traditional top-to-bottom relations established by governmental
authority, no clearly established hierarchy exists among the various
agents exerting influence on international commercial society within
transnational civil regulation.209 For the past several decades, globalization has transformed the landscape of international civil and business
regulations.210 The polyphonic view has finally caught up with corporate

labeling and certification schemes, rating agencies, sustainable monitoring, reporting
transparency, and disclosure guidelines. Barricades and Boardrooms, supra note 49, at
27–30.
208. See EU Green Paper, supra note 48, at 6.
209. See Ronnie D. Lipschutz, supra note 191, at 259, 261. Nevertheless, significant
connections remain between civil regulations and conventional ‘hard’ legal regimes. See
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards
Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 44, 48
(Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009). For example, civil regulations adopted by
private enterprise tend to incorporate host countries’ domestic legal norms. See id. at 49.
Moreover, many private regulatory initiatives result from regulatory standards promulgated by intergovernmental organizations, such as the International Finance Corporation
of the World Bank, the International Labor Organization, and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development. Id. at 44. Further, the United Nations and the
European Union, along with the governments of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany,
Great Britain, and the United States, have all been involved in promoting the establishment of global industry codes of conduct. See K. J. Holsti, Governance Without Government: Polyarchy in Nineteenth-Century European International Politics, in GOVERNANCE
WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 30, 55–56 (James N.
Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
210. See Thomas J. Biersteker, The “Triumph” of Neoclassical Economics in the Developing World, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN
WORLD POLITICS, 102, 110–11 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992);
Rosenau, supra note 4, at 13; Scholte, supra note 20, at 15–23; cf. ROBERT W. COX,
Structural Issues of Global Governance: Implications for Europe, in APPROACHES TO
WORLD ORDER 237 (1996) (examining diminishing political authority of the European
nation-states who are members of the European Union and its impact on its regulatory
landscape).
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governance.211 That, together with the advent of CSR, reveals the private
sector’s intensifying influence on public policy and regulation.212 Scholars have noted that the regulatory power of the state is undergoing
extensive decentralization under the influence of globalization.213 Accordingly, blends of state and market, public and private, and traditional and
self-regulatory institutional structures, characterized by alliances built
among nation-states, NGOs, and business enterprises, are replacing the
traditional mode of top-to-bottom hierarchical regulation.214
Public policy once created and enforced through official regulatory
organs, such as environmental boards and employment nondiscrimination panels, is being handled by means of dialogue, negotiation, and cooperation between the public and private sectors.215 Consequently, global
business regulatory instruments are undergoing transformation.216 Global
business regulation is no longer restricted to administrative and legislative activity.217 It encompasses market-oriented agents that impose business disclosure, monitoring, reporting, and transparency requirements,
backed with reputational sanctions to address business misconduct.218

211. Cf. Knill & Lehmkuhl, supra note 11, at 44–45. See generally R. Edward Freeman, Andrew C. Wicks & Bidhan Parmar, Stakeholder Theory and the “Corporate
Objective Revisited”, 15 ORGANIZATION SCIENCE 364, 364 (2004); R. Edward Freeman,
supra note 121, at 409–22.
212. See Lester M. Salaman, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An
Introduction, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 1, 8,
11–14 (Lester M. Salamon & Odus V. Elliott eds., 2002).
213. Cf. Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, Decentralized Enforcement in Organizations:
An Experimental Approach, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 165–92 (2008) (concluding that
social and cultural norms dominate state regulation and its policy-making as far as civil
enforcement).
214. See generally Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89
MINN. L. REV. 498, 498 (2004) (discussing employment disputes, organizational compliance, financial regulation, and employee misconduct).
215. See, e.g., David Hess, Social Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The
Prospects of Achieving Corporate Accountability through Transparency, 17 BUS. ETHICS
Q. 453, 455 (2007); see also Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the
Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 371–76
(2004).
216. See Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law 55 S.
ECON. J. 644, 658 (1989).
217. See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 9, at 110; LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW
MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW 39 (1983) (delineating historical
development of transnational business litigation); see also supra text accompanying note 9.
218. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 213, at 165 (2008).
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C. The “Triangular” Nature of Authority
Civil regulation is comprised of market-based, nonstate, and private
regulatory structures.219 These components govern the behavior of transnational enterprises along with their global supply networks.220 One of
the chief characteristics of civil regulation is that its enforcement, governance, and legitimacy do not rest on traditional institutions of public
authority.221 Whereas, traditionally, corporate governance was shaped by
substantive law promulgated by governmental authority, today’s transnational businesses function within a new slate of authorities.222 Areas of
authority traditionally reserved to government are now shared with
nonstate authorities.223
Civil regulations ordinarily function alongside nation-states, not from
within.224 Thus, as opposed to hard law, civil regulations are the product
of “soft law,” or private law, rather than of nation-states’ legally enforceable norms.225 In that sense, companies subject to a multitude of civil
regulations face reputational rather than legal penalties.226 The advent of
soft-law’s regulatory influence outside nations’ regulatory schemes has
empowered transnational nonstate actors.227 The result is that the private
sector has a much more prominent public role, and private authorities
have a growing role in transnational economic regulation. 228 Corporations increasingly form a part of an emerging global public domain. Civil
regulations, however, do not supplant nation-states. Instead, they institute
219. Cutler, Haufler & Porter, supra note 4, at 3; see Scholte, supra note 20, at 19.
220. See sources cited supra note 219.
221. See sources cited supra note 219.
222. See Cutler, Haufler & Porter, supra note 4, at 4–18; Scholte, supra note 20, at
19.
223. See ROBERT W. COX, Structural Issues of Global Governance: Implications for
Europe, in APPROACHES TO WORLD ORDER 237, 237 (1996) (discussing the shift of
authority away from the states in the European Union).
224. See Virginia Haufler, Globalization and Industry Self-Regulation, in GOVERNANCE
IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN TRANSITION 226, 226 (Miles Kahler &
David A. Lake eds., 2003).
225. See id. at 226–27.
226. See John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilock, Introduction: Hard Choices and Soft
Law in Sustainable Global Commerce, in HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAW: VOLUNTARY
STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 3, 6, 11 (John J.
Kirton & Michael J. Trebilock eds., 2004). See generally SOFT LAW IN GOVERNANCE AND
REGULATION (Ulrika Moth ed., 2004); Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft
Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 434–50 (2000).
227. See Haufler, supra note 224, at 226–27.
228. See VIRGINIA HAUFLER, THE PUBLIC ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR: INDUSTRY
SELF-REGULATION, IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 12–15 (2001); see also Hall & Biersteker,
supra note 4, at 3– 4.
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governance systems within wider global structures of “social capacity
and agency” where none existed before.229 The advent of civil regulation
spells the emergence of what some scholars term a global “governance
triangle,” wherein nation-states are but a single source of global regulatory authority.230
The notion of governance without government made its debut in the
scholarly literature during the 1990s. 231 Its debut, precipitated by economic globalization, highlighted the changes that globalization caused in
the governance structure of international society. 232 The term “governance” came to be used to refer to self-organizing systems that stand
alongside the hierarchies and markets that comprise government structures.233 Global governance, in turn, refers to the expansion of the sphere
of influence of governing structures to entities beyond nation-states that
do not possess sovereign authority.234 Governance and government are in
fact two logically distinct notions. Governance connotes a process
founded on absence of centralized international governmental authority.
Ideally, “global governance” undertakes the role within the international
realm that governments assume within the nation-state.235
D. Forms of Civil Regulations
The growth of corporate social responsibility reveals the emergence of
novel global governance mechanisms and business civil regulations.236
Global companies are deploying a variety of devices to propagate principles for responsible business conduct.237 These may be categorized as
follows: (1) self-regulation—voluntary mechanisms taken on individually
in the market; (2) inter-firm cooperation—voluntary tools established
229. See Ruggie, supra note 55, at 519.
230. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 209, at 44–50.
231. See Linda Cornett & James A. Caporaso, “And Still It Moves” State Interests and
Social Forces in the European Community, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT:
ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 219, 228 n.21 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto
Czempiel eds., 1992).
232. See id.
233. R. A. W. Rhodes, The New Governance: Governing Without Government, 44
POL. STUD. 652, 660 (1996).
234. Lawrence S. Finkelstein, What is Global Governance?, 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
367, 369 (1995).
235. See James N. Rosenau, Citizenship in a Changing Global Order, in GOVERNANCE
WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 272, 286–87 (James N.
Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
236. See Cutler, Haufler & Porter, supra note 4, at 20.
237. See Laura Albareda, Corporate Responsibility, Governance and Accountability:
From Self-Regulation to Co-Regulation, 8 CORP. GOVERNANCE 430, 430 (2008).
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cooperatively between firms and business associations; and (3) coregulation and multi-stakeholder partnerships—voluntary mechanisms
developed collaboratively with other entities, such as public-private and
hybrid partnerships (governments, international organizations, NGOs,
trade unions, and governments).238
1. Voluntary Self-Regulation
Numerous large, global companies institute their own codes of conduct
that aim to regulate their operations worldwide.239 One example of voluntary self-regulation is the Leon Sullivan Foundation’s promulgation of
the Global Sullivan Principles of Social Responsibility (the “Principles”)
in 1999.240 The Principles encompass a breadth of CSR concerns, such
as: employee freedom of association, health and environmental standards, and sustainable development.241 Fortune 500 companies are now
motivated to adjust their internal practices to comply with the standards
found within the Principles.242
238. See id. at 435–36.
239. See, e.g., Gene R. Laczniak & Jacob Naor, Global Ethics: Wrestling with the
Corporate Conscience, BUS., July—Sept. 1985, at 7 (discussing the examples of Allis
Chalmers, Caterpillar Tractor, Chiquita Brands International, Medtronic, and S.C. Johnson). While there are firms that do not have comprehensive codes addressing their international operations, many adopt codes that include sections that speak to foreign practices.
Id. For instance, Northrop Grumman Corporation’s “Standards of Business Conduct” contains an “International” segment. Northrop Grumman Corporation, Standards of Business
Conduct, at 10, http://www.northropgrumman.com/pdf/noc_standards_conduct.pdf (last
visited Sept. 20, 2009). The section reads, in relevant part:
Employees and consultants or agents representing the company abroad or
working on international business in the United States should be aware that the
company’s Values and Standards of Conduct apply to them anywhere in the
world. Less than strict adherence to laws and regulations that apply to the company’s conduct of international business would be considered a compromise of
our Values and Standards of Conduct.
Id.
240. See The Sullivan Foundation, The Global Sullivan Principles, http://www.
thesullivanfoundation.org/gsp/principles/gsp/default.asp (last visited Sept. 3, 2009).
241. The objectives of the Principles are to support economic, social, and political
justice by firms wherever they conduct operations; to advance human rights and to promote equality of opportunity at all levels of employment, including racial and gender
diversity on decision-making committees and boards; and to train and advance disadvantaged workers for technical, supervisory, and management opportunities. Id.
242. See, e.g., Gordon Leslie Clark & Tessa Hebb, Why Do They Care? The Market
for Corporate Global Responsibility and the Role of Institutional Investors 17–23 (June
16, 2004) (unpublished paper presented at the Using Pensions for Social Control of Capitalist Investment conference, available at http://www.community-wealth.org/_pdfs/
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In 2005, the Global Business Standards (“GBS”) Codex was published
by a group of scholars.243 Intended “as a benchmark for [firms] wishing
to create their own world-class code,” the GBS Codex set forth eight
principles shared by five well-known codes that are embraced by the
world’s largest companies.244 Incorporated in the principles were standards in the following categories: citizenship, dignity, fairness, fiduciary,
property, reliability, responsiveness, and transparency. 245 Individual
corporate codes of conduct usually contain an amalgamation of prudential,
technical, and moral norms, declared as general principles. 246 Critics
point to the various codes’ failures to include enforcement sanctions and
failures to emphasize profit maximization. 247 Yet corporations increasingly specify criteria such as “profitability” and “shareholder interests”
in their mission statements.248 Nevertheless, they also affirm that corporate responsibility for “stakeholder interests” means considering both
community interests and sustainability.249
articles-publications/state-local/paper-clark.pdf) (noting that CalPERS’ may withhold
investment in companies that do not meet the Sullivan Principles, thus creating the risk of
reputational harm).
243. See Lynn Paine, Rohit Deshpandé, Joshua D. Margolis & Kim Eric Bettcher, Up
to Code: Does Your Company’s Conduct Meet World-Class Standards?, HARV. BUS.
REV., Dec. 2005, at 122.
244. Id. at 124–25.
245. See id. at 125.
246. See generally GLOBAL CODES OF CONDUCT: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME
(Oliver F. Williams ed., 2000); RAYMOND J. WALDMANN, REGULATING INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS THROUGH CODES OF CONDUCT 21 (1980).
247. WALDMANN, supra note 246, at 65 (discussing the need to emphasize profit);
James E. Post, Global Codes of Conduct: Activists, Lawyers, and Managers in Search of
a Solution, in GLOBAL CODES OF CONDUCT: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME 103,
111(Oliver F. Williams ed., 2000) (expanding on the lack of enforcement criticism).
248. Broadhurst, supra note 42, at 89.
249. The credo of Johnson & Johnson, for instance, is particularly noteworthy:
We believe our first responsibility is to the doctors, nurses and patients, to
mothers and fathers and all others who use our products and services. In meeting their needs everything we do must be of high quality. We must constantly
strive to reduce our costs in order to maintain reasonable prices. Customers’
orders must be serviced promptly and accurately. Our suppliers and distributors
must have an opportunity to make a fair profit.
We are responsible to our employees, the men and women who work with us
throughout the world. Everyone must be considered as an individual. We must
respect their dignity and recognize their merit. They must have a sense of security in their jobs. Compensation must be fair and adequate, and working conditions clean, orderly and safe. We must be mindful of ways to help our employees fulfill their family responsibilities. Employees must feel free to make
suggestions and complaints. There must be equal opportunity for employment,
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2. Inter-Firm and Cross-Industry Cooperation
As key agents in the global economy, transnational firms wield enormous clout to influence economic activities. 250 Firms utilize various
instruments to influence global civil society. Among the more significant
mechanisms are inter-firm and cross-industry cooperative instruments.251
These instruments are developed through CSR business associations,252
which formulate strategies for concerted action in the form of selfregulating proposals within the private sector.253 These nongovernmental
associations of businesses promote the dissemination of best business
practices.254 They seek to establish universal, uniform standards to combat a wide range of practices including apartheid, conflicts of interest,
deception, discrimination, embezzlement, executive compensation, fraud,
forgery, genocide, insider trading, the misuse of pension funds, slavery,
theft, and corruption.255 Business associations serve as forums for corpodevelopment and advancement for those qualified. We must provide competent
management, and their actions must be just and ethical.
We are responsible to the communities in which we live and work and to the
world community as well. We must be good citizens—support good works and
charities and bear our fair share of taxes. We must encourage civic improvements and better health and education. We must maintain in good order the
property we are privileged to use, protecting the environment and natural
resources.
Our final responsibility is to our stockholders. Business must make a sound
profit. We must experiment with new ideas. Research must be carried on, innovative programs developed and mistakes paid for. New equipment must be purchased, new facilities provided and new products launched. Reserves must be
created to provide for adverse times. When we operate according to these principles, the stockholders should realize a fair return.
Johnson & Johnson, Our Credo, http://www.jnj.com/wps/wcm/connect/c7933f004f5563
df9e22be1bb31559c7/our-credo.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
250. Cutler, Haufler & Porter, supra note 4, at 6.
251. See Albareda, supra note 237, at 435–36.
252. See id. at 434.
253. Such business associations include: Business in the Community, Business for
Social Responsibility, Caux Round Table, CSR Europe, Forum Empresa, International
Business Leaders Forum, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and World
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD).
254. For example, Business for Social Responsibility runs programs including business
ethics, the workplace, the marketplace, the community, the environment, and the global
economy. See BSR, How We Work, http://www.bsr.org/about/how-we-work.cfm (last
visited Sept. 12, 2009).
255. For example, the Caux Round Table, headquartered in Switzerland, has adopted
an international code for multinational firms in Europe, North America, and Japan. The
Code identifies five basic principles which, as statements of aspirations for business lead-
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rate leaders to discuss and agree on a CSR plan. This entails creation of
consolidated private rules, standards, and management instruments, all in
the absence of legally enforceable “hard” sanctions.256 The associations
often serve as a means for collective exertion of pressure, in order, for
instance, to defend the corporations’ positions before national governments and international organizations, such as the European Union and
the United Nations.257 As such, business associations serve as an interface between public and private authorities.258
Joining cooperative regulations is a wise business tactic for companies
whose social or environmental practices have been targeted by activists.
Whereas implementing higher environmental or social standards normally increases costs, attracting the competition to follow suit levels the
playing field.259 At least in theory, industry and cross-industry standards
inhibit companies from competing with each other. In their absence,
firms would engage in a “race to the bottom” by adopting less rigorous
protections for employees or the environment.260 Similarly, civil regulations help companies to assist each other in establishing best practices.261
They also assist with communication and implementation of operational
upgrades recommended by civil society.262 It is noteworthy that NGOs’
participation in civil regulations accords a higher degree of legitimacy
than obtained by codes of conduct authored by individual companies.263

ers worldwide, extend far beyond those embodied in earlier codes. The principles cover:
1) stakeholder responsibility, 2) social justice, 3) mutual support, 4) environmental
concern and 5) avoidance of illicit operations and corrupt practices. Caux Round Table,
Principles For Business, http://www.cauxroundtable.org/index.cfm?&menuid=8 (last visited
Sept. 22, 2009).
256. See Albareda, supra note 237, at 433.
257. For example, the “WBCSD defended a voluntary approach before the United
Nations; CSR Europe did the same before the European Commission, [the executive
branch of the European Union], and individual European governments, and BSR has
done the the same with the United States government.” Id. at 435.
258. Although typically underwritten by corporate contributions, inter-firm initiatives
sometimes obtain financial backing from international organizations. Id. at 436 (noting
contributions from European Union, various national governments, and the United States).
259. See Sethi & Sama, supra note 169, at 89.
260. Debora Spar & David Yaffe, Multinational Enterprises and the Prospects for
Justice, 52 J. INT’L AFF. 557, 557 (1999).
261. See Broadhurst, supra note 42, at 95–96.
262. See id. at 97.
263. See Dara O’Rourke, Market Movements: Nongovernmental Organization Strategies to Influence Global Production and Consumption, J. INDUS. ECOLOGY, Winter/
Spring 2005, at 115, 122; see also Sethi & Linda, supra note 169, at 99–100.
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This partnership increases the credibility of a company’s commitments to
corporate social responsibility.264
Moreover, transnational enterprises often follow their industry peers to
implement comparable procedures and norms.265 This “follow the leader”
dynamic spreads managerial protocols, global CSR undertakings being
among them.266 Hence, if an industry leader consents to a code of practices, its industry peers typically follow suit. 267 This trend also works
across sectors.268 Indeed, the rise of civil regulations among global companies and industries has provided its own impetus as market participants
wish to avoid losing reputational capital.269
Lastly, even ill-intended modifications in standards often have a substantial and lasting impact on business practices.270 CSR-type initiatives
that originate as mere symbolic gestures or efforts at appeasement may
well acquire legitimacy among global civil society.271 In today’s increasingly transparent global economy, staffing a CSR office, sending out an
annual CSR report, combining forces with NGOs, signing on to voluntary industry codes, and having a chief reputation officer are all becoming
standard operating practices for management at global companies that
attract high visibility.272
3. Co-regulation and Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships
Together with self-regulation instruments, transnational firms are increasingly implementing various CSR mechanisms and civil regulations
geared to a number of collaborative regulatory arrangements. 273 They
arise out of crossbreed devices originating with civil society bodies and

264. See O’Rourke, supra note 263, at 125.
265. See generally Marvin B. Lieberman & Shigeru Asaba, Why Do Firms Imitate
Each Other?, 31 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 366, 366–75 (2006).
266. See id. at 366.
267. See Broadhurst, supra note 42, at 97.
268. See id.
269. See Alison Maitland, Industries Seek Safety in Numbers, FIN. TIMES (Special Report), Nov. 25, 2005, at 1. The headline by the author here is ostensibly intended as a
quip.
270. See Lieberman & Asaba, supra note 265, at 366.
271. See Claire Moore Dickerson, Human Rights: The Emerging Norm of Corporate
Social Responsibility, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1431, 1440 (2002) [hereinafter Emerging Norm];
see also Claire Moore Dickerson, Transnational Codes of Conduct Through Dialogue:
Leveling the Playing Field for Developing-Country Workers, 53 FLA. L. REV. 611, 613
(2001).
272. See generally Emerging Norm, supra note 271, at 1431 (discussing the relationship between corporate social responsibility and human rights movement).
273. See Albareda, supra note 237, at 435–36.
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business associations.274 One of the motivations for collaborative governance is the ability to provide public goods through alliances. 275 For
example, some civil regulations and civil regulatory bodies have been
instituted with the backing of trade unions, inter-state organizations, or
governments.276 Nevertheless, nation-states have not insisted on enforcing the regulations, which, after all, are not compulsory.277 Instead, states
have mainly played the role of intermediaries.278 They help companies
and, in some instances, NGOs and labor unions, to reach a consensus on
mutual standards.279 Such multi-stakeholder initiatives amount to publicprivate systems of co-regulation.280
Business-NGO cooperative arrangements have emerged over the past
several years.281 There is a significant variety among these cooperative
arrangements.282 In addition, an array of regulatory bodies is undertaking
multi-stakeholder projects such as the Ethical Trading Initiative that

274. See id. at 435–36.
275. Simon Zadek, The Logic of Collaborative Governance: Corporate Responsibility,
Accountability, and the Social Contract 4 (Corporate Soc. Responsibility Initiative,
Working Paper No. 17, 2006), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/mrcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper _17_zadek.pdf. See generally Ruggie, supra note
55, at 499–531.
276. The United Nations Environmental Program, for instance, assisted in setting up
the Electronics Industry Code of Conduct. Similarly, the governments of the United
States and the United Kingdom assisted companies in extractive industries in assembling
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. In addition, the government of Austria helped underwrite the Forest Stewardship Council.
277. See generally O’Connell, supra note 9, at 110.
278. See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 24, at 198–200.
279. See, e.g., id.
280. See, e.g., id.
281. See Peter Utting, Corporate Responsibility and the Movement of Business, 15
DEV. PRACTICE 375, 384–85 (2005).
282. Various NGOs—such as Amnesty International, the Clean Clothes Campaign, the
Council on Economic Priorities, Greenpeace, Oxfam, and the World Wildlife Fund—
have partnered with trade associations active in the areas of apparel, cocoa, chemicals,
coffee, electronics, mining, and toys, as well as trade unions, and other organizations,
such as the International Textile Workers Association and the International Standards
Organization. See Tim Bartley, Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The
Rise of Transnational Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions, 113
AM. J. SOC. 297, 335 (2007) (discussing in detail case studies of the codes’ development
in the apparel and timber sectors) [hereinafter Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization]; see also Tim Bartley, Certifying Forests and Factories: States, Social Movements, and the Rise of Private Regulation in the Apparel and Forest Products Fields, 3
POL. & SOC’Y 433, 434–35 (2003); Lars H. Gulbrandsen, Overlapping Public and Private
Governance: Can Forest Certification Fill the Gaps in the Global Forest Regime?, 4
GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 75, 81 (2004).
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seeks to promote compliance with labor guidelines within the context of
business supply chains.283
The growth of these arrangements has given corporations a role in
global public policy networks. 284 Global public policy networks are
coalitions linking civil society organs, firms, government agencies, international organizations, NGOs, professional associations, and religious
groups.285 Companies that join global public policy networks commit to
dialogue with other stakeholders to devise ethical standards.286 Their objective is to establish monitoring mechanisms for firms, so as to improve
accountability.287 The formation of global public policy networks takes
place on three levels: (1) establishment of standards, (2) development of
regulatory structures, and (3) creation of assessment and enforcement
systems.288
For example, the Global Reporting Initiative is a partnership of the
Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (“CERES”) and
the United Nations Environmental Program (“UNEP”), linking firms,
governments, the media, NGOs, and professional associations in order to
establish uniform reporting standards to assess the organizations’ environmental and social impact.289 Signatory firms agree to observe CERES
principles and to preserve and protect the environment at levels exceeding what local law mandates.290 Every five years, CERES conducts an
independent audit to certify that signatory companies are in compliance
with the principles.291
As for Western NGOs, many of them deem co-regulation initiatives an
effective way to influence trends in transnational corporate conduct.292
Altering procurement protocols of corporate giants such as Carrefour,
283. Other multi-stakeholder initiatives are the Forest Stewardship Council, the Global
Reporting Initiative, the Marine Stewardship Council, and the United Nations Global
Compact. See, e.g., GRI Portal, About GRI, http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/
(last visited Sept. 1, 2009).
284. See generally David Antony Detomasi, The Multinational Corporation and Global Governance: Modelling Global Public Policy Networks, 71 J. BUS. ETHICS 321, 321
(2007).
285. See Wolfgang H. Reinicke, The Other World Wide Web: Global Public Policy
Networks, FOREIGN POL’Y, Winter 1999, at 44. See generally WOLFGANG H. REINICKE,
GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY: GOVERNING WITHOUT GOVERNMENT 228 (1998).
286. See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 24, at 159–60.
287. See, e.g., id. at 168-69.
288. See generally id. at 550.
289. See Global Reporting Initiative, History, http://www.globalreporting.org/About
GRI/WhatIsGRI/History/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2009).
290. See id.
291. See id.
292. See Vogel, supra note 176, at 267.
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Tesco, and Wal-Mart can obtain more substantial environmental and
social results than enacting even massive quantities of national regulations.293 Although some NGOs stress strategies that “name and shame”
multinational corporations, others opt to combine forces with companies
and industry associations to establish voluntary standards and take an
active part in their enforcement.294 The NGOs’ forming of coalitions with
transnational companies has been instrumental to the creation, legitimacy,
and efficacy of civil regulations.295
A number of Western governments, particularly those in Europe, are
supporting civil regulations. The European Union has offered substantial
support for global CSR. 296 Some European governments implicitly
endorse CSR by demanding that firms trading on their stock exchanges
distribute annual reports detailing environmental and social performance.297 Additionally, public pension funds are either encouraged or, at
times, required to take firms’ environmental and social track records into
account in choosing investments.298 Moreover, some governments grant
preferences for privately certified merchandise pursuant to their procurement policies.299
Various features of civil regulation resemble characteristically European attitudes toward business regulation. That is, the European Union,
along with a number of European governments, lean heavily on voluntary agreements and soft-law, often turning to nonstate actors to formulate
regulatory standards. 300 In the eyes of some European governmental
293. Philipp Pattberg, The Institutionalization of Private Governance: How Business
and Nonprofit Organizations Agree on Transnational Rules, 18 GOVERNANCE 589, 590
(2005).
294. See Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization, supra note 282, at 299–
300.
295. See Pattberg, supra note 293, at 589–610; Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson & Sasser,
supra note 197, at 61; Dennis A. Rondinelli & Ted London, How Corporations and Environmental Groups Cooperate: Assessing Cross-sector Alliances and Collaborations, 1
ACAD. MGMT. EXEC. 61, 62–76 (2003).
296. Kristina Herrmann, Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainable Development: The European Union Initiative as a Case Study, IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.,
Summer 2004, at 205, 227 (2004).
297. See Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization, supra note 282, at 302–
03.
298. See id. at 336.
299. See id. at 337.
300. See, e.g., MICHELLE EGAN, CONSTRUCTING A EUROPEAN MARKET 263 (2001);
Christopher Ansell & David Vogel, The Contested Governance of European Food Safety
Regulation, in WHAT’S THE BEEF?: THE CONTESTED GOVERNANCE OF EUROPEAN FOOD
SAFETY 8–9 (Christopher Ansell & David Vogel eds., 2006); Jan Willem Biekart,
Negotiated Agreements in EU Environmental Policy, in NEW INSTRUMENTS FOR
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authorities, endorsing global civil regulations is a convenient way of
assuaging home-country activists and trade unions that may well be
antagonistic to globalization and the immense political sway held by
multinational companies.301 This, however, does not grant nation-states
sole regulatory authority over firms operating in their territories.
Thus one notable benefit of civil regulations as a mechanism of global
business regulation is that their terms are outside the World Trade
Organization’s (“WTO”) purview, as the WTO’s regulations have force
only if accepted by national governments.302 Whereas the WTO deems
government-mandated eco-labels to constitute potential trade barriers,
private product certifications and labels do not have that status.303 Similarly, whereas companies could require global suppliers’ compliance
with environmental rules and labor standards as a prerequisite for transacting business, governments typically may not condition market access
upon such requirements.304
In the case of co-regulation and multi-stakeholder partnerships, CSR’s
focus shifts away from voluntariness and toward accountability backed
by enforcement mechanisms. 305 Accordingly, public accountability
mechanisms for private actors constitute a centerpiece of the emerging
global governance paradigm. 306 As illustrated below, such emerging
governance networks are “held in orbit” around the notion of reputational

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE EU 166 (Jonathan Golub ed., 1998); Olivier Borraz,
Julien Besançon & Christophe Clergeau, Is It Just About Trust? The Partial Reform of
French Food Safety Regulation, in WHAT’S THE BEEF?: THE CONTESTED GOVERNANCE OF
EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY 137–139 (Christopher Ansell & David Vogel eds., 2006);
Jonathan Golub, New Instruments for Environmental Policy in the EU: Introduction and
Overview, in NEW INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE EU 5, 13–15,
(Jonathan Golub ed., 1998); Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Towards a Legal Concept of the Network in European Standard-Setting, EU COMMITTEES: SOCIAL REGULATION, LAW AND
POLITICS 151, 156–159 (Christian Joerges & Ellen Vos eds., 1999); Stephen Tindale &
Chris Hewett, new Enviromental Policy Instruments in the UK, in NEW INSTRUMENTS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE EU 52–53 (Jonathan Golub ed., 1998); Frans van Waarden, Taste, Traditions, and Transactions: The Public and Private Regulation of Food, in
WHAT’S THE BEEF?: THE CONTESTED GOVERNANCE OF EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY 56–57
(Christopher Ansell & David Vogel eds., 2006).
301. See Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization, supra note 282, at 337.
302. See Steven Bernstein & Erin Hannah, Non-State Global Standard Setting and the
WTO: Legitimacy and the Need for Regulatory Space, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 575, 575–608
(2008).
303. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Informing Consumers of CSR in International Trade, ¶¶ 44–46, June 28, 2006.
304. See Vogel, supra note 176, at 264–65.
305. See Utting, supra note 281, at 381.
306. See id. at 383–86.
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capital. Reputational sanctions and rewards linked to global firms’ most
valuable asset (reputational capital) therefore constitute an emerging
mode of accountability in global governance.307 Global firms utilize corporate legitimacy management to shift the role of businesses in society at
large.308 Meanwhile, multi-stakeholder initiatives provide the forum for a
dialogue between business and society—a dialogue that is required for
accountability mechanisms to work. 309 Moreover, involvement in
co-regulation and enforcement of multi-stakeholder devices is connected
with the new idea of corporate citizenship, or what has been termed
“political activism.”310 Through these devices, citizens can participate in
dialogue with, and can influence, the conduct of businesses in the
environmental and social spheres.311
E. Why Global Businesses Adopt Voluntary Regulations
1. Protecting Reputations
To a significant extent, the growth and influence of civil regulations is
attributable to the rise of global brands. The pervasiveness of branding
means that companies are becoming increasingly vulnerable to attacks on
their reputations in consumer, labor, and financial markets. Moreover,
firms’ reputations are susceptible to technological advancements in
communication via broadband internet, coupled with the advent of decentralized and globally available media, such as Facebook, YouTube,
and Twitter, to name a few, as well as the proliferation of inexpensive
voice and text communication via wireless handheld devices. 312 Such
307. Id. at 384 (discussing the relationship between rewards and penalties on accountability and performance); Ross, supra note 32, at 8 (arguing that managing reputation
requires awareness of stakeholder’s opinion and the capacity to respond); see JACKSON,
supra note 31, at 35–38 (explaining that the market rewards or sanctions corporate deeds
and misdeed).
308. See Beverly Kracher & Kelly D. Martin, A Moral Evaluation of Online Business
Protest Tactics and Implications for Stakeholder Management, 114 BUS. & SOC’Y REV.
59, 61–64 (2009) (discussing businesses’ managing corporate image in response to activists’ using the internet to protest “objectionable business practices”).
309. See Guido Palazzo & Andreas Georg Scherer, Corporate Legitimacy as Deliberation: A Communicative Framework, 66 J. BUS. ETHICS 71, 77, 82 (2006); Zadek, supra
note 275, at 5.
310. See generally Virginia Haufler, Self-Regulations and Business Norms: Political
Risk, Political Activism, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 199, 199
(A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler & Tony Porter eds., 1999) (arguing that corporate
behavior is guided by principles and norms beyond profit maximization).
311. See Dirk Matten & Andrew Crane, Corporate Citizenship: Towards an Extended
Theoretical Conceptualization, 30 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 166, 172–173 (2005).
312. See Kracher & Martin, supra note 308, at 62–64; cf. Ross, supra note 32, at 7.
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technologies subject companies to attack by blogs, spoofs, e-mail
campaigns, parasites, and other protest campaigns. 313 This technology
has made it easier for activists to obtain and disseminate information
concerning business conduct at the speed of light around the globe.314
Thus, inability to hide, literally and figuratively, in a distant part of the
world has made reputation a valuable commodity.
Consequently, the bulk of civil regulations emerge as a result of citizen
campaigns aimed at specific business behavior, enterprises, or industry
sectors.315 The number of such campaigns has gradually increased over
the past two decades.316 They address workplace conditions, fair wages,
child labor, agricultural worker compensation, sustainable forestry practices, corruption, environmental preservation, and human rights.317 Such
campaigns to “name and shame” corporate character have targeted prominent companies including Citibank, Exxon, Levi-Strauss, Monsanto,
Nike, Royal Dutch Shell, The Gap, Nestlé, Rio Tinto, Starbucks, Union
Carbide, and Wal-Mart. 318 The assault on corporate character through
modern media, reaching audiences globally, has pressured transnational
companies to behave with increased responsibility.319
The combination of two trends, in CSR and firms’ building and preservation of their reputational capital, has manifested in a nascent
framework of global governance. The movement has led companies to
develop environmental and social standards and to formulate strategies
that impact their supply chains.320 Additionally, companies have begun to
reconfigure as “relational corporations,” from “vertical” to “flat” and
from domestic to international. 321 They have also begun to transition

313. See sources cited supra note 312.
314. See Kracher & Martin, supra note 308, at 62–64; cf. Ross, supra note 32, at 7–8.
315. See Tim Bartley & Curtis Child, Shaming the Corporation: Reputation, Globalization, and the Dynamics of Anti-Corporate Movements 2 (Aug. 11, 2007) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://www.Indiana.edu/~tbsoc/SM-corps-sub.pdf); see also
O’Rourke, supra note 263, at 115. See generally NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO (2001) (providing a vivid discussion of the resulting dynamics triggered by activists, and their effect on
the global brands and international business).
316. Vogel, supra note 176, at 268
317. See generally supra notes 310–315 and accompanying text.
318. See Kracher & Martin, supra note 308, at 62; see also Bartley & Child, supra
note 315.
319. See Kracher & Martin, supra note 308, at 59; see also O’Rourke, supra note 263,
at 121–22, 124 (discussing the role of the media in successful campaigns by NGOs
against companies, specifically by the foreign press and international NGOs in the antisweatshop market campaign against Nike).
320. See Vogel, supra note 176, at 268; see also Scholte, supra note 20, at 19.
321. See Lozano, supra note 131, at 60–63.
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away from managing relationships and toward building relationships.322
Moreover, in cooperation with civil society actors, firms continue to
implement settled transnational, environmental, and social regulation
standards, which substantially impact the firms’ reputations.323
2. Breakdown in Global Governance
Over the last twenty years, globalization has transformed the world
economic landscape. 324 The situs of manufacturing has moved from
industrialized nations to developing nations.325 In addition, global corporations’ production and supply chains transcend national borders more
than ever.326 The bulk of transnational commerce occurs among firms or
inter-firm networks.327 The rise of global civil regulation has, in significant measure, resulted from the recognition that globalization dampens
the ability of national legal authorities to effectively regulate global
companies and markets. 328 Hence, it has been observed that, although
some multinational firms are as powerful as some small nation-states,
they are less accountable.329
While state and international business regulations are still growing in
range and degree, today’s global economy, while highly integrated, is
plagued by regulatory breakdown.330 The multinational nature of global
manufacturing strains national governments’ abilities to control economic activity outside of, and straddling, their own territories.331 National and
global regulatory frameworks will remain dangerously ineffective so
long as national governments and global companies alike are incapable
of controlling, or ill-disposed to control the international trade’s envi-

322. See id.
323. See ZADEK, supra note 25, at 66.
324. See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (1999)
(providing a multifaceted account of the phenomenon that we call “globalization”);
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 51 (2007) (describing the “ten forces that flattened the world,” global corporations being among them).
325. See CARROLL & BUCHHOLTZ, supra note 29, at 395 (noting the trend that jobs
follow manufacturing).
326. See RICHARD T. DE GEORGE, COMPETING WITH INTEGRITY IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS 78–79 (1993); DONALDSON, supra note 5, at 30-35.
327. See generally sources cited supra note 324.
328. See Vogel, supra note 176, at 266.
329. See Peter Newell, Environmental NGOs and Globalization, in GLOBAL SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS 117, 121 (Robin Cohen & Shirin Rai eds., 2000).
330. See Peter Newell, Managing Multinationals: The Governance of Investment for
the Environment, 13 J. INT’L DEV. 907, 908 (2002).
331. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 209, at 44.
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ronmental and socioeconomic externalities. Yet, the rise of civil regulation does not signify an outright replacement of state regulation. Rather,
it signifies an attempt to expand regulation to a broad array of transnational corporate conduct that remains difficult to regulate via purely
national mechanism.332 The advent of novel types of public civil regulation
has resulted in reputational accountability, complementing nation-states’
regulations that have proven inadequate in the era of globalization.333
IV. REPUTATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS
As a result of major industry scandals, coupled with the recent global
financial meltdown, and motivated by accountability principles, corporate management is implementing ethical, transparency, and disclosure
standards. 334 The following discussion aims to highlight the need for
global corporate governance to recognize the crucial role of the rule of
reputation. The need to adopt voluntary civil regulations is especially
strong for firms operating in the global environment. The traditional concept of legal accountability is distinguishable from the emerging concept
of reputational accountability. As will be shown, the latter is especially
intricate since it entails multifaceted components of accountability. This
section will illustrate how the reputational capital model of corporate
governance influences managerial decision-making—namely, how
managers seek to accommodate the burgeoning demands for reputational
accountability under the emerging regime of civil regulations.
A. Legal Accountability
Legal accountability simply means that normative regulatory standards
are enforceable. 335 Compliance with black-letter legal rules creates a
presumption of validity in the eyes of judicial tribunals or quasi-judicial
forums.336 The notion of legal accountability stems from the rule of law
332. See Koenig-Archibugi, supra note 197, at 234–35.
333. See Knill & Lehmkuhl, supra note 11, at 44–45.
334. Some of the well-known institutions embroiled in the scandals are Nicholas
Leeson, the British Barings Bank, as well as the infamous Enron, WorldCom, Aldelphia,
Arthur Anderson, and Tyco. See Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
for Organizations: A Decade of Promoting Compliance and Ethics, 87 IOWA L. REV. 697,
707 (2002); see also Note, The Good, the Bad, and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics:
Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley, and the Problems with Legislating Good Behavior, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 2123, 2126 (2003); Brian A. Warwick, Commentary, Reinventing the Wheel: Firestone and the Role of Ethics in the Corporation, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1455, 1466–71 (2003).
335. See Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in
World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 36 (2005).
336. Cf. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 11 (1967) (discussing validity of norms
and noting that if a norm is not obeyed, it is thus not valid); H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT
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maxim.337 A vast body of civil and criminal law has developed to hold
non- and for-profit institutions legally accountable.338 In the international
arena, the WTO Dispute Settlement System, the Hague International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court, are just some
of the institutions that enforce “hard” international law.339 Of course, an
actor’s failure to comply with law will typically trigger reputational sanctions as well; and compliance may provide for its own reputational
rewards.340
Similar to the early international law phenomena, civil regulations,
absent hard enforcement mechanisms, function as mere normative stan-

OF LAW 197 (1961) (noting that if the “system is fair,” it “may gain and retain allegiance”).
337. Throughout the latter part of the 20th century, one of the central topics addressed
by legal philosophers was the nature of the rule of law. See Robert P. George, Reason,
Freedom, and the Rule of Law: Their Significance in the Natural Law Tradition, 46 AM.
J. JURIS. 249, 249 (2001). Arguably one reason for the keen attention extended to the
concept was the rise and decline of totalitarian governments. See id. “In the aftermath of
the defeat of Nazism, legal philosophers of every religious persuasion tested their legal
theories by asking, for example, whether the Nazi regime constituted a legal system in
any meaningful sense.” Id. Following the collapse of communism throughout Europe,
scholars of jurisprudence sought to account for the manner in which legal institutions and
procedures foster respectable democracies. See id. Today, the rise of global civil regulations for business leads to the analogous question of whether, and to what extent, such
initiatives embody the rule of law. On this point, reference to the fundamental components of legality is illuminating. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev.
ed. 1964) (Basic elements constituting the “internal morality” of law are: nonretroactivity, amenability to compliance, promulgation, clarity, coherence, temporal
constancy, generality, and congruence between official behavior and rules.). Arguably,
global business civil regulations display many if not all of these characteristics.
338. See Parker, supra note 181, at 207–17; see also Alnoor Ebrahim, Making Sense of
Accountability: Conceptual Perspectives for Northern and Southern Nonprofits, 14 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 191, 194–95 (2003).
339. Concerning violence and nation-states, enormous changes have come about in
relevant international standards, practices, and institutions. War crimes tribunals and the
International Criminal Court were established in order to make accountable, to the point
of incarceration, chiefs of states that deploy violence aimed at their own populace. These
developments represent a tremendous departure from customary norms governing the
principle of national sovereignty. That principle extended immunity to heads of states
from legal petitions for accountability, save from members of their own principalities.
Indeed, an inaugural precept of the nation-state system, observed all the way from Westphalia in 1648 to Nuremberg in 1946, dictated that heads of states enjoyed immunity
from prosecution. See Geoffrey Robertson, Ending Impunity: How International Criminal Law Can Put Tyrants on Trial, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 649, 650 (2005).
340. See Ross, supra note 32, at 11.
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dards and are intended to persuade compliance.341 Corporations comply
with soft law in order to protect their intangible reputational assets; it is
not that they are deterred by enforcement sanctions.342 Arguably, a regime of global civil regulations and the accompanying rule of reputation
comprise an integral part of both the domestic and international rule of
law. They are, however, often ignored by commentators because they are
only backed by reputational sanctions, the nature and extent of which are
not always fully appreciated.343 To fully account for the ontology of civil
regulation and actors’ compliance internationally, the concept of reputational capital must be incorporated into our current thinking about corporate governance. A deeper inquiry into the various sources of soft law,
however, reveals its intricacy and complexity. Global civil regulations
embody a compromise among private and public entities. Rather than
imposing cost of compliance with formal regulation, civil regulations
encourage corporations to examine their conduct and guide it by means
of voluntary self-regulation. 344 Global civil regulations are continually
undergoing an organic evolution, yet national law depends on its institutions to act, which takes longer.345
B. Reputational Accountability
From the standpoint of the conventional rule of law maxim and its
experience, voluntary CSR seems utterly inadequate. That is, CSR is de341. Cf. Terry Nardin, Theorizing the International Rule of Law, 34 REV. OF INT’L
STUD. 385, 389 (2008) (noting that compliance with international law is a result of a
desire for legitimacy).
342. See Göran Ahrne & Nils Brunsson, Soft Regulation from an Organizational Perspective, in SOFT LAW IN GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION 171, 187–89 (Ulrika Mörth ed.,
2004).
343. Cf. Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Common Law: The
Soft Law of International Tribunals, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 515, 519, 522-23 (2009) (arguing
that the reputational impacts of following or forgoing soft law is difficult to anticipate
and remains a puzzle).
344. See Ian Maitland, The Limits of Business Self-Regulation, 27 CAL. MGMT. REV.
132, 132 (1985).
345. The sources of law applied and enforced by courts of law are generally understood by both legal practitioners and scholars. But what sources of “soft law” are applied
by reputational accountability-holders? Consider the famous dictum that the task of
jurists is to prophesize what courts will do. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457–58 (1897). This so-called “predictive theory” of law
helps us understand the nature of the “soft law” of accountability holders. “The idea is
that the law [of soft law] resides in the actual judgment given, not in any crisp preexisting
formulation in a statute or case precedent.” JACKSON, supra note 31, at 38. The challenge
for firms is to forecast what these (non-legal and unelected) accountability-holders
expect. Id.
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centralized, it carries conflicting norms, it is run by bureaucrats,346 and
there are no hard sanctions for noncompliance.347 The concept of reputational accountability offers an explanation for how the enforcement of
civil regulations makes global firms more accountable. Accountability
means that actors may ensure that other actors also follow standards, and
may apply sanctions for noncompliance with those standards.348 In the
context of global corporate governance, civil regulations that impact a
firm’s reputational capital arguably represent the strongest sanctions, as a
firm’s most valuable, albeit intangible, asset is its reputation.349
1. Elements of Reputational Accountability
The process of corporate reputational accountability involves the following three components.350 First, reputational accountability presupposes the existence of civil regulations that hold companies accountable;
thus, compliance is expected.351 Similar to the maxim that the law must
be knowable—i.e., that it must be published by the State so that citizens
can discover what rights and responsibilities are given or imposed upon
them by law—civil regulations must also be a matter of common knowledge.352 Second, reputational accountability requires that “enforcement
agents” possess relevant information about firms’ actions to evaluate
346. From this standpoint, the rise of global governance raises questions about the
legitimacy of the actors attempting to hold transnational firms accountable. The theory of
rent seeking proceeds from the hypothesis that the priority of typical bureaucrats are to
advance their own self-interest. Consequently, if restraints of accountability and election
are removed, bureaucrats become owners of rents, with the power to potentially raise
these rents at the cost of those for whom the resources are supposed to benefit. Rosemary
Righter argues that United Nations institutions provide substantial income for the politicians and bureaucrats that control them, and that the objectives for which they were set
up are absorbing ever smaller portions of their internal budgets. See generally ROSEMARY
RIGHTER, UTOPIA LOST: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE WORLD ORDER 56–63 (1995).
347. See Cyrus Mehri, Andrea Giampetro-Meyer & Michael B. Runnels, One Nation,
Indivisible: The Use of Diversity Report Cards to Promote Transparency, Accountability,
and Workplace Fairness, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 395, 400–01 (2004); see also
Vogel, supra note 176, at 261, 264, 266, 273.
348. See Grant & Keohane, supra note 335, at 29.
349. Cf. Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms
Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON. 757, 758-59 (1993) (noting that
majority of falling stock price in the wake of corporate malfeasance, whether proven or
not, is attributable to reputational loss, whereas anticipated legal sanctions, including
fines and damage awards comprise only 6 percent of the decline in share value).
350. This analysis builds upon the discussion by Robert O. Keohane, illustrating the
power dimensions of accountability demands. See Keohane, supra note 32, at 362.
351. Cf. id. at 362.
352. See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
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compliance with applicable civil regulations.353 Thus, on the one hand, to
be held accountable, firms must be aware of the expectations.354 On the
other hand, enforcement agents must know by what standards to render
an assessment of business conduct. 355 Because accurate information is
essential, some measure of transparency and dialogue among stakeholders appears to be a prerequisite for reputational accountability.356 Third,
reputational accountability depends upon the existence of incentives for
compliance.357 That is, enforcement agents must be able to impose reputational sanctions or reputational rewards. 358 Of course, no worldwide
government, democratic or otherwise, exists to provide wholesale regulation.359 Consequently, demands for corporate accountability are decentralized and, thus, diffused.
2. Enforcement of the Rule of Reputation
Whereas the concept of legal accountability derives its central meaning
from the notion of the rule of law (ultimately upheld by courts), the concept of reputational accountability may be understood in terms of the rule
of reputation. The rule of reputation is upheld by market participants that
evaluate business conduct within several forums. For instance, the
“Forum of Key Constituents” is especially significant for business enter353. Keohane, supra note 32, at 362, 366.
354. See Ross, supra note 32, at 11.
355. See id. at 5.
356. See generally Pamela Stapleton & David Woodward, Stakeholder Reporting: The
Role of Intermediaries, 114 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 183, 184 (2009) (noting the important
role of the dialogue with and among stakeholders).
357. According to Robert Keohane, the notion of accountability involves both sharing
of information regarding actions, decisions, or behavior of some kind and the exercise of
sanctions. See Robert O. Keohane, The Concept of Accountability in World Politics and
the Use of Force, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1121, 1123–24 (2003).
358. See JACKSON, supra note 31, at 150–52.
359. In the eyes of one commentator, what we are witnessing is a worldwide diffraction of traditional forms of representative democracy, alongside an overall mistrust of
politics. See PIERRE ROSANVALLON, DEMOCRACY PAST AND FUTURE 192–93 (Samuel
Moyn ed., 2006). Replacing procedural representation by means of elections, alternative
modes of representation are becoming prevalent within civil society, such as functional
representation by experts, and ethical representation, asserted by social groups and NGOs.
Such developments increase the number of political players, diffusing political legitimacy.
“We are moving bit by bit to more disseminated forms of civil democracy,” id. at 235, an
“indirect democracy,” created by “whole congeries of efforts—through informal social
movements but institutions too—intended to compensate for the erosion of trust by institutionalizing distrust.” Id. at 238. Indirect democracy is engaged in the deployment of
“mechanisms of oversight, the creation of independent institutions, and the formation of
powers of rejection.” Id. at 239.

2010]

CORPORATE REPUTATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY

93

prises. 360 “Key Constituents” are firms’ customers, employees, and
investors, whose authority and control are exerted in transactions occurring in consumer, labor, and capital markets respectively.361 For example,
individual investors as well as mutual funds may cease investing in companies whose practices or policies they find objectionable. 362 Some
pension funds shun securities of certain companies, often on the basis of
criteria determined by their beneficiaries.363 Alternatively, investors may
require higher interest rates on corporate bonds. 364 Further, customers
may decline to purchase the products produced by firms struck by negative publicity stemming from human rights violations, unfair labor practices, or environmental violations.365 It has been shown that consumers
are willing to incur added costs, such as the cost of traveling greater distances, in order to punish retailers whose conduct they find egregiously
unfair.366 Finally, those in employment markets may select among competing job offers on the basis of the prospective employer’s publicity and
reputation.367
Business partners and associates comprise another type of forum for
the evaluation of conduct. This forum functions as a peer-driven reputational accountability network powered by the process of business partners’
reciprocal appraisals.368 Institutional lenders, for instance, use caution in
scrutinizing their borrowers’ creditworthiness as well as that of their

360. JACKSON, supra note 31, at 36.
361. See id. at 106–108.
362. The Council on Economic Priorities reports that there are three key factors
accounting for escalation in social and ethical investing: (1) the existence of more reliable
and more sophisticated data regarding corporate social performance than previously; (2)
investment firms utilizing social criteria have a demonstrated track record, and it is not
necessary for investors to sacrifice gains for principles; (3) the socially conscious generation of the 1960s is currently engaged in rendering investment decisions. See, e.g., First
Affirmative Financial Network, LLC, Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) In the United
States, http://www.firstaffirmative.com/news/sriArticle.jsp (last visited Oct. 12, 2009);
see also Samuel B. Graves & Sandra A. Waddock, Institutional Owners and Corporate
Social Performance, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1034, 1034 (1994).
363. See R. Bruce Hutton, Louis D’Antonio & Tommi Johnsen, Socially Responsible
Investing: Growing Issues and New Opportunities, 37 BUS. & SOC. 281, 288 (1998).
364. LAYNA MOSLEY, GLOBAL CAPITAL AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS 18 (2003).
365. Spar, supra note 47, at 9.
366. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 718, 735–36
(1986).
367. JACKSON, supra note 31, at 13.
368. Grant & Keohane, supra note 335, at 35. “When standards are not legalized, we
would expect accountability to operate chiefly through reputation and peer pressures,
rather than in more formal ways.” Id.
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partners’ borrowers.369 Business enterprises that are rated low by their
peers are less likely to find willing business partners among them. 370
These businesses find themselves in a strategic disadvantage and therefore tend to stagnate.371
Next is the forum of public opinion, or the proverbial “court of public
opinion.” 372 Public reputational accountability means that members of
civil society penalize companies by promulgating negative publicity.373
Lawmakers, courts, government regulators, fiscal watchdogs, journalists,
competitors, licensing boards, rating agencies, and markets, all render
judgments about the reputations of market participants.374 In fact, reputation constitutes a type of “soft power,” which has been characterized as
“the ability to shape the preferences of others.”375 Companies with tarnished reputations find it hard to establish relationships, assert authority,
or attract loyalty from others.376
The Royal Dutch Shell scandal involving the Brent Spar and the Ogoni
in Nigeria presents a vivid example of a company experiencing a reputational crisis as a result of its failure to comply with public social expectations and its neglect of both environmental and human rights standards.377 In 1995, Shell made plans to sink a large decommissioned oil
buoy storage rig in the North Sea. It conducted an environmental impact
assessment and gained approval from the government of Great Britain.378
Greenpeace activists challenged the proposed deep-sea dumping and
alleged that Shell’s sinking the rig would cause serious environmental

369. JACKSON, supra note 31, at 13.
370. Id. at 14.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 36.
373. “Reputation risk is the current and prospective impact on earnings and capital
arising from negative public opinion.” STEVEN HERZ, ANTONIO LA VIDA & JONATHAN
SOHN, DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT CONFLICT: THE BUSINESS CASE FOR COMMUNITY
CONSENT 14 (Jonathan Sohn ed., 2007), available at http://www.wri.org/publication/
development-without-conflict.
374. See JACKSON, supra note 31, at 42, 45.
375. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS 5
(2004).
376. See JACKSON, supra note 31, at 15, 36.
377. See generally Joshua P. Eaton, Note, The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of Transnational Corporations, and the Human Right to a Healthy Environment,
15 B. U. INT’L L.J. 261, 261 (1997); see also Scott Greathead, The Multinational and the
“New Stakeholder”: Examining the Business Case for Human Rights, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 719, 724 (2002).
378. See Graeme Smith, Precedent Feared as Shell Saves £34m: Atlantic Grave
Approved for Giant Oil Installation, HERALD (Glasgow), Feb. 17, 1995, at 9.
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damage.379 Shell disputed the claim on scientific grounds and maintained
that sinking was the best available option.380 Since Shell refused to abandon its plans, Greenpeace, acting in front of television crews, surrounded
the rig with small boats and even occupied it. 381 Millions of protests
erupted throughout Europe.382 In response to Greenpeace’s pressure and
the boycotts, Shell abandoned its sinking strategy and towed the rig to a
Norwegian fiord.383
Reversing its original plan cost Shell considerable expense.384 In addition, when Shell failed in the same year to intercede to stop the execution
of Ken Saro-Wiwa in Nigeria, voices worldwide expressed indignation.385 Saro-Wiwa, a writer, businessman, and political journalist, had
organized the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People to take a
stand against mounting problems with Shell and the government of
Nigeria.386 Saro-Wiwa, along with nine others, was tried for the murder
of four Nigerian officials, a fabricated accusation.387 Saro-Wiwa was not
tried by a traditional court, but rather a special tribunal that refused to
admit evidence of innocence.388 As the defendants were found guilty and
sentenced to death, Shell stated that political issues were not their
concern.389 Magazines and newspapers roundly called for punishment of
Nigeria and Shell, the Sierra Club initiated a massive boycott campaign
against the company, and celebrities advocated a U.S. oil embargo.390
Shell’s subsequent efforts to revive its reputation in the aftermath of the
Spar and Nigerian scandals, while very expensive, were successful at

379. See id. at 9.
380. See generally Greenpeace Admits Error Against Shell, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1995,
at D2.
381. See Shell Oil Platform to Become a Pier, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Jan. 30, 1998, at
Business 1.
382. JACKSON, supra note 31, at 36.
383. See Shell Oil Platform to Become a Pier, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Jan. 30, 1998, at
Business 1.
384. In January 1998, after assessing a range of proposals, Shell opted to cut up the rig
and turn it into a pier in Norway, costing the company approximately $42 million, over
twice the cost of dumping the rig into the sea. See id.
385. JACKSON, supra note 31, at 36.
386. Eaton, supra note 377, at 269.
387. Id. at 270.
388. See id. at 270 (citing Paul Lewis, Nigeria Rulers Back Hanging of 9 Members of
Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1995, at A9).
389. See id. at 271 (citing Paul Lewis, Rights Groups Say Shell Oil Shares Blame,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1995, at A6).
390. Christopher S. Wren, U.S. is Seeking Further Ways to Punish Nigeria for Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1995, at 1.11.
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averting a public relations crisis, which could have been relentless.391 By
contrast, companies that achieve superior reputations within each of the
above forums, enjoy a host of advantages.392 In that sense, reputational
accountability involves not just punishing firms but also rewarding them
for their compliance with civil regulations and commitment to CSR.
C. Networks of Reputational Accountability
Reputational accountability in global economic governance is multifaceted. Global companies operate within networks of continuous relationships. Firms are linked with their customers, suppliers, and even rivals
via strategic alliances.393 When companies enter into arrangements with
various parties, such as government regulators and special interest groups,
they are in effect establishing “reputational networks.” These networks
form a variety of channels of accountability, which are divided by and
cover a range of topical areas. On the other hand, relationships involving
international organizations typically establish sequences of accountability.394 In addition, multiple intersecting accountability relationships exist
when different groups of market participants, with potentially diverse
interests, set out to hold other agents accountable for their behavior.395
In the modern business environment, companies confront manifold and
frequently incompatible or contradictory reputational accountability demands.396 Often it is not sufficient to meet the demands of shareholders
and credit markets.397 Moreover, it is not enough to comply with legal
rules as law often lags behind rapidly evolving social norms. 398 Busi391. See Eaton, supra note 377, at 270–71; see also sources cited supra notes 386–89.
392. See JACKSON, supra note 31, at 13, 47, 59.
393. See id. at 5.
394. In a common accountability sequence, an agent will be authorized by a given
accountability relationship, and yet another such relationship will restrict it. Thus, the
International Accounting Standards Board holds companies responsible for accounting
practices, yet is itself accountable to the entities granting authority to it, namely the G-7
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors and the International Organization of
Securities Commissions. See Keohane, supra note 32, at 364.
395. Thus, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement, both attempt to hold multinational pharmaceutical companies accountable, yet the shareholders of the pharmaceutical companies also
hold the firms accountable. See Stephanie A. Barbosa, Note, Implementation of the
DOHA Declaration: Its Impact on American Pharmaceuticals, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 205,
207–211 (2004) (citing Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, opened for signature Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; 33 I.L.M. 1197(1994)).
396. See Ross, supra note 32, at 8, at 11–13.
397. See id. at 7–8.
398. CARROLL & BUCHHOLTZ, supra note 29, at 41.
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nesses, however, must remain mindful of their constituencies’—peers,
the media, and advocacy groups—reactions to their actions. Various calls
for reputational accountability concerning a firm’s conduct reveal conflicting expectations of outside observers.399
A reputational crisis can also rapidly spread to infect an extensive network. For example, the uncovering of accounting irregularities at the
Indian outsourcing firm Satyam Computer Services, Ltd. led to immediate suspicion about the firm’s global auditor, PriceWaterhouseCoopers,
and prompted a group of its clients, including Cigna, Citigroup, CocaCola, GlaxoSmithKline, Merrill Lynch, Nissan, Novartis, Pfizer, and
State Farm Insurance to move their business away from the firm.400
D. Reputational Accountability is Dynamic
Mandates for reputational accountability undergo a constant process of
change as activist campaigns are impermanent and public interest and
attention are constantly shifting; in general, however, the bar continues to
rise.401 For example, only a few decades ago, controversy regarding environmental and labor conditions was almost nonexistent, whereas today it
is front and center.402 Those unable to forecast these shifts tend to lag
behind the current norms.403 As far as reputational accountability is concerned, such lag may cause strategic problems.404 New laws and regulations may be enacted, the ire of civil society activists raised, or reputations sullied before managers implement remedial measures. Thus, a key
399. See generally JACKSON, supra note 31. For example, when U.S. West contributed
to the Boy Scouts of America they were criticized by gay-rights activists. Id. at 109. Yet
when Levi-Strauss ceased its funding of the Boy Scouts, they were attacked by many
religious leaders. Id. Similarly, the retailer Dayton-Hudson donated to Planned Parenthood. Id. This led to anti-abortion demonstrators outside of the company’s stores. Id. The
company reversed its stance and began contributing to anti-abortion groups instead. This
move was met by pro-choice protesters’ denouncing the company for abandoning their
cause. Id.
400. Sarah Johnson, No Way Out?, CFO, Mar. 2009, at 73; Lison Joseph, Customer
Desertion Could Lower Valuations of Satyam: iGate, LIVEMINT.COM, Mar. 17, 2009,
http://www.livemint.com/2009/03/17225447/Customer-desertion-could-lower.html.
401. See CARROLL & BUCHHOLTZ, supra note 29, at 15–16.
402. See generally Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization, supra note 282,
at 297.
403. See generally Michael D. Watkins & Max H. Bazerman, Predictable Surprises:
The Disasters You Should Have Seen Coming, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2003, at 72, 74.
404. For example, in the Financial Times 1997 annual survey of Europe’s most respected corporations, the Times cited the public criticism of Shell’s ethical behavior in
connection with environmental and human rights issues as the main cause of the firm’s
precipitous fall in ranking. BP Steals the Limelight from Shell, FIN. TIMES (Surveys
edition), Sept. 24, 1997, at I-II.
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motivation for companies to become industry leaders in building reputational capital is the need for additional insurance against reputational
harm from negative publicity and pressures that may be detrimental to
the company.405 In such instances, having a superior reputation may turn
out to be a global company’s most valuable asset, albeit an intangible
one.406
E. Implications for Global Operations
To integrate the considerations of reputational capital into global corporate governance is to recognize the corporation’s reputation as a productive asset that generates capital, not only for the firm’s shareholders,
but ultimately for a broad range of constituents. Of course, reputational
capital goes unrecorded on corporate balance sheets. But creating shareholder value extends beyond capitalization on traditional balance sheet
assets; it also entails leveraging value from the company’s reputational
capital.407
A firm will realize competitive advantage by correctly forecasting
“new waves” of civil society’s expectations for responsible corporate
conduct. Corporate officers must develop the ability to effectively reach
consensus with key decision makers regarding new waves of demand for
CSR.408 To become industry leaders in terms of CSR standards, corporations must implement internal ethical standards and focus on their visions,
developing strategies to beat the competition. Having to define accountability requirements imposes a burden and diverts managers from profit-

405. See generally JOE MARCONI, CRISIS MARKETING: WHEN BAD THINGS HAPPEN TO
GOOD COMPANIES 26 (2d ed. 1997).
406. As one scholar writes:
[C]ompanies that have built up a stock of reputational capital may enjoy an
extra measure of goodwill in times of difficulty or crisis. This goodwill can
cash out in varied and sometimes surprising ways—as other parties refrain
from using their superior bargaining power, remain willing to forego costly and
time-consuming formalities, or tolerate mistakes they would otherwise challenge.
PAINE, supra note 17, at 49.
407. See DOWLING, supra note 172, at 145 ; FOMBRUM & VAN RIEL, supra note 172, at
33; see also FOMBRUN, supra note 172, at 1; JACKSON, supra note 31, at 1; PAINE, supra
note 17, at 49. See generally ALSOP, supra note 172, at 1.
408. See SHARON H. GARRISON, THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF CORPORATE EVENTS ON
CORPORATE STAKEHOLDERS 3–6 (1990); Ian I. Mitroff & Mural C. Alpaslan, Preparing
for Evil, HARV. BUS. REV., Apr. 2003, at 109, 115; see also Ian I. Mitroff, Crisis
Management and Environmentalism: A Natural Fit, CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter 1994, at
101, 101–02.
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creating activity.409 If firms fail to comply with reputational accountability requirements, however, they may eventually face reputational sanctions. Still, over time, industry as a whole seeks to catch up with its leaders and innovators. 410 At this point, no special advantage comes from
compliance with the new norms. Nevertheless, the emerging global civil
regulations function as sign-posts for corporations. Following their
trends, firms may institutionalize norms to respond to their demands.
V. CRITICISMS AND REPLIES
On the one hand, the advent of global civil regulation and CSR has
been hailed as a panacea to the unhealthy symptoms caused by the inability of nation-states to regulate internationally.411 For example, laws are
often outpaced by rapidly developing technology.412 This often happens
in technical fields, such as the supervision and regulation of risk in the
banking industry.413 In this context, international industry leaders call for
allowing institutions’ own risk models to participate in financial regulation.414 On the other hand, while acknowledging the numerous positive
aspects of self-regulation, critics contend that voluntary business regulations are intrinsically unable provide a comprehensive regulatory landscape, especially because transnational firms may evade regulation by
relocating.415 Moreover, critics allege that civil regulations are too soft
when it comes to regulating conduct as compared to the hard rule of
law.416 For example, absent any adjudicative institution with multinational
409. See F.A. Hayek, The Corporation in a Democratic Society: In Whose Interest
Ought It and Will It Be Run?, in BUSINESS STRATEGY 225, 225–26 (H. Igor Ansoff ed.,
1969) (arguing that such activities place the corporation beyond what must be considered
its “sole task” of generating capital); see also Keith Davis, The Case for and Against
Business Assumption of Social Responsibilities, 16 ACAD. MGMT. J. 312, 318–19 (1973).
410. See generally JIM COLLINS & JERRY I. PORRAS, BUILT TO LAST: SUCCESSFUL
HABITS OF VISIONARY COMPANIES 93, 181 (2002) (discussing the example of the Boeing
Company).
411. See ANDREW SAVITZ, THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE: HOW TODAY’S BEST-RUN
COMPANIES ARE ACHIEVING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS—AND
HOW YOU CAN TOO 193–94 (2006).
412. See James, supra note 15, at 20.
413. See id.
414. See id.
415. See LIPSCHUTZ & ROWE, supra note 181, at 154, 167.
416. See, e.g., ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
VOLUNTARY APPROACHES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: AN ASSESSMENT (1999); see
also Madhu Khanna, The U.S. 33/50 Voluntary Program: Its Design and Effectiveness, in
REALITY CHECK: THE NATURE AND PERFORMANCE OF VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL
PROGRAMS IN THE U.S., EUROPE, AND JAPAN 15, 15 (Richard D. Morgenstern & William
A. Pizer eds., 2007). See generally Michael J. Lenox & Jennifer Nash, Industry Self-
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or international jurisdiction, it is difficult to obtain redress for human
rights violations if the victim’s home state does not provide the same.417
In addition, conceptual difficulties arise to the extent that civil regulations amount to self-regulation and are voluntary codes that merely codify
firms’ or their primary subjects’ responsibilities.418 A potential drawback
is the perception that compliance with the codes is undertaken on a purely voluntary or discretionary basis. 419 Nevertheless, logic dictates that
responsibility for human rights, in their broad sense,420 stems from the
fundamental maxim that people possess a bundle of human rights that
may not be transgressed.421 Acknowledging the universality of the human
rights principle negates the notion that firms’ human rights responsibilities
are purely voluntary or discretionary. Rather, the universal maxim of
human rights imposes overriding obligations on transnational firms.
Human rights norms fall squarely within the category of hypernorms.422
Therefore, any CSR initiative that seeks to comply with human rights
hypernorms should be viewed as mandatory, rather than discretionary.
The Integrative Social Contract Theory, however, fails to account for
why corporations commit their resources to advancing human rights.
While detailing the firms’ decision making processes, the ISCT focuses
on mechanisms for resolving conflicts between authentic norms and
hypernorms. 423 The theory does not address the businesses’ economic
motivations, resources, or competencies.424 The ISCT framework is thus
deficient. Under the ISCT, a firm’s decision to act responsibly with
respect to human rights remains discretionary, or, within “moral free
space.”425 This, however, betrays the nondiscretionary nature of human
rights. An alternative theory is necessary—namely, the theory of reputational capital. The latter best accounts for how firms, recognizing the
mandatory nature of human rights obligations, can expect support from
civil society while proactively advancing them, thus improving their
financial and social standing.

Regulation and Adverse Selection: A Comparison Across Four Trade Association Programs, 12 BUS. STRATEGY & ENV’T 343, 343 (2003); Eaton, supra note 377, at 297.
417. See Prudence E. Taylor, From Environmental to Ecological Human Rights: A
New Dynamic in International Law?, 10 Geo. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 359 (1998).
418. See Khanna, supra note 416, at 15, 35.
419. See id. at 15, 31–32.
420. See Eaton, supra note 377, at 261, 297.
421. Ven, supra note 146, at 50.
422. See DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note 12, at 74–81.
423. See Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 147, at 89.
424. See id. at 90–94, 109–110.
425. DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note 12, at 38.

2010]

CORPORATE REPUTATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY

101

While the practical impact of civil regulations is slight, it is nevertheless palpable. The scores of intergovernmental treaties and agreements
have been ineffective, at least in the area of ecological preservation.426
Civil regulations provide greater influence than inter-governmental treaties with respect to human rights, workplace conditions, and forestry
practices as they reach beyond national borders.427 Yet in the absence of
universally accepted criteria for assessing such impact, it is difficult to
draw solid conclusions.
But the reputational pressure is on. In order to effectuate positive
change in businesses’ environmental and socioeconomic practices in the
developing world, activists in the West make public demands on wellreputed, high-profile transnational companies based in Europe and the
United States.428 These demands and pressures often obviate the need for
governmental involvement in the sphere that is left unchecked due to
governments’ limitations.429 The main aim in this process is to transfer
the more demanding regulatory guidelines from the developed world to
businesses, industries, and markets in the developing world.430 In doing
so, civil regulations cause the “California effect”—the export of higher
standards through international trade.431
Of course, international civil regulations are arguably more effective
than the human rights, environmental, and labor standards originating
from the developing world. 432 Indeed, civil regulations are almost the
exclusive source of effective business regulation for many developing
countries.433 Global civil regulations have led to greater levels of compliance with human rights, workplace, and environmental standards by
426. See generally THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE (David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala
& Eugene B. Skolnikoff eds., 1998).
427. See Winston, supra note 48, at 71–72.
428. See id. at 81.
429. See Virginia Haufler, Global Governance and the Private Sector, in GLOBAL
CORPORATE POWER 85, 90, 92 (Christopher May ed., 2006); Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT 160, 170–71 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel
eds., 1992) (as an example, discussing the whaling industry); see also Robert Falkner,
Private Environmental Governance and International Relations: Exploring the Links,
GLOBAL ENVIRON. POL., May 2003, at 72, 79 (2003).
430. See John Gerard Ruggie, Taking Embedded Liberalism Global: The Corporate
Connection, in TAMING GLOBALIZATION: FRONTIERS OF GOVERNANCE 93, 106–08 (David
Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi eds., 2003).
431. DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN
GLOBAL ECONOMY 748 (1995).
432. See Winston, supra note 48, at 76.
433. See id. at 72–73.
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Western companies or their affiliates operating in a developing region.434
However, some would deny this claim or discount its significance. 435
Indeed, the traditional regimes of hard law and the emerging regimes of
soft law are capable of working together.436 They are not mutually exclusive vehicles for corporate governance. While civil regulations offset
some deficiencies in governmental regulation, they need not completely
replace or substitute the hard regulation that originates in domestic,
regional, or global arenas. The continuing success of private global business regulation hinges on the degree to which its standards and its instrumentalities for accountability can be successfully incorporated into,
and strengthened by, regulatory procedures backed by both traditional
legal sanctions and emergent reputational sanctions at domestic, regional,
and transnational levels.437
Another criticism is that manufacturers in the developing world consider the Western civil regulations to be a burden on their development.438 Critics point out that compliance with Western codes elevates
434. See, e.g., A. Claire Cutler, Transnational Business Civilization, Corporations,
and the Privatization of Global Governance, in GLOBAL CORPORATE POWER 199, 199–
200 (Christopher May ed., 2006); Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of
International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER
OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 39, 39 (Thomas
Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 1999). See generally ASEEM PRAKASH
& MATTHEW POTOSKI, THE VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTALISTS: GREEN CLUBS, ISO 14001,
AND VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS (2006); Jean-Philippe Thérien & Vincent Pouliot, The Global Compact: Shifting the Politics of International Development, 12
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 55, 55 (2006) (discussing the example of the UN Global Compact).
435. See, e.g., Don Wells, Too Weak for the Job: Corporate Codes of Conduct, Nongovernmental Organizations and the Regulation of International Labour Standards, 7
GLOBAL SOC. POL’y 51, 73 (2007). See generally JILL ESBENSHADE, MONITORING
SWEATSHOPS: WORKERS, CONSUMERS, AND THE GLOBAL APPAREL INDUSTRY (2004).
436. Lorne Sossin & Charles W. Smith, Hard Choices and Soft Law: Ethical Codes,
Policy Guidelines and the Role of the Courts in Regulating Government, 40 ALTA. L.
REV. 867, 869 n.5 (noting that relationship between “soft” and “hard” law “is analogous”
to the relationship between a computer’s software and hardware).
437. See, e.g., HALINA WARD, PUBLIC SECTOR ROLES IN STRENGTHENING CORPORATE
SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: TAKING STOCK 381 (2004); see also CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
INITIATIVE, LEADERSHIP, ACCOUNTABILITY AND PARTNERSHIP: CRITICAL TRENDS AND
ISSUES IN CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (2004).
438. See, e.g., Orly Lobel. Sustainable Capitalism or Ethical Transnationalism: Offshore Production and Economic Development, 17 J. OF ASIAN ECON. 56, 56 (2006). See
generally DAVID HENDERSON, MISGUIDED VIRTUE: FALSE NOTIONS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY 58 (2001); DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND
LIMITS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (2005).
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business costs.439 Consequently, companies in developing countries are
tempted to follow the bare minimum in terms of compliance with
requirements foisted upon them by Western contractors. 440 Their relationships with private inspectors and ethics auditors often turn hostile
and even involve instances of deception.441
Similar criticisms are leveled at Western companies as well. Critics
contend that Western firms adopt civil regulations merely as public relations ploys to divert attention away from wrongdoing, or as marketing
strategies, or in reaction to public and peer influences.442 For example,
the Global Compact is accused of “blue washing.”443 It permits membercompanies to exhibit the blue logo of the United Nations, while ignoring
their failure to file annual reports and their mere token efforts to comply
with the Compact’s standards.444 Thus, critics contend that the corporations become free-riders.445 Some companies have even been accused of
violating the Compact’s principles.446
Nevertheless, not all CSR initiatives lack genuine commitment. Arguably, those with genuine respect for civil regulations, as opposed to their
mere instrumental value for good business, are most likely to reap long
term reputational and financial rewards. The public, in the long run, is
able to discern which firms exhibit a genuine commitment to CSR.447
Indeed, the critics’ assertions that many corporations act insincerely
439. See Lobel, supra note 438, at 56. See generally HENDERSON, supra note 438, at
58.
440. See Lobel, supra note 438, at 56.
441. For an insightful documentary into factories’ working conditions, see A DECENT
FACTORY (First Run/Icarus Films 2004). See Dexter Roberts & Pete Engardio, Secrets,
Lies and Sweatshops, BUS. WK., Nov. 27, 2006, at 50, 50–58.
442. See Surya Deva, Global Compact: A Critique of the U.N.’s “Public-Private”
Partnership for Promoting Corporate Citizenship, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 107,
147 (2006)
443. Ralph Nader, Corporations and the U.N.: Nike and Others “Bluewash” Their
Images, SAN FRANCISCO BAY GUARDIAN, available at www.commondreams.org/views/
091900-103.htm.
444. See Deva, supra note 442, at 147–48; see also Evaristus Oshionebo, The U.N.
Global Compact and Accountability of Transnational Corporations: Separating Myth
from Realities, 19 FLA. J. INT’L L. 1, 36–37 (2007).
445. See Pete Engardio, Commentary, Global Compact, Little Impact, BUS. WK., July
12, 2004, at 86, 86–87; Oliver F. Williams, The UN Global Compact: The Challenge and
the Promise, 14 BUS. ETHICS Q. 755, 757 (2004).
446. Among those criticized were Aventis, Bayer, BHP, Nestle, Nike, Norsk Hydro,
Rio Tinto, Shell, Unilever, and the International Chamber of Commerce. See David M.
Bigge, Bring on the Bluewash: A Social Constructivist Argument Against Using Nike v.
Kasky to Attack the UN Global Compact, INT’L LEGAL PERSP., Spring 2004, at 6, 12–13
(2004).
447. See Winston, supra note 48, at 86–87.
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presuppose that it is possible to distinguish disingenuous public relations
ploys from sincere moral commitments. In other words, the skeptic’s
argument assumes what it wants to deny—that corporations are behaving
wrongly when they use CSR superficially instead of honoring environmental and social standards for their own sake. If it were true that all
corporations always act insincerely, meaning, therefore, that they are
incapable of acting otherwise, then what would be the point of drawing
our attention to, and condemning, such behavior?
In addition, critics doubt whether firms that proactively comply with
civil regulations in order to merely enhance profitability can ultimately
grow reputational capital.448 In other words, critics insist that the pure
profit motivation necessarily taints any purported ethical act. Addressing
this important objection requires reflection upon two fundamental points.
First, wealth creation is itself a source of public good.449 Second, while
getting reputational rewards from CSR most likely requires genuine
commitment, it is unnecessary and likely impossible to gauge the degree
of its authenticity, as the motives for corporate compliance with CSR are
notoriously complex.450 The public, however, deplores corporate marketing and public relations campaigns masquerading as citizenship and
social responsibility initiatives, especially when used to divert attention

448. Ella Joseph & John Parkinson, Confronting the Critics 10 (Jan. 18, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.ippr.org.uk/uploadedFiles/events/confronting
critics.PDF). But see Vogel, supra note 33, at 25–26.
449. Roger Scruton makes this point as follows:
The very same ‘invisible hand’ that, according to Mandeville and Smith, produces public good from the pursuit of private profit, produces private profit
from the pursuit of public good. Moral and economic values are not in competition
but, in the right context, to pursue the one is to obtain the other: and the dependency goes both ways.
Roger Scruton, Virtue and Profit: a Critique of Managerial Reasoning, in RETHINKING
BUSINESS MANAGEMENT: EXAMINING THE FOUNDATIONS OF BUSINESS EDUCATION 22, 24
(Samuel Gregg & James Stoner eds, 2d ed. 2008).
450. One author identifies four ways in which companies respond to demands placed
by CSR, arguing that taken together they establish a business case for CSR. ZADEK,
supra note 25, at 64. The four approaches are distinguished as follows: (1) defensive
approach, intended to alleviate pain; (2) traditional cost-benefit approach holding that
firms commit to activities for which they can see direct benefits exceeding costs; (3) strategic approach, according to which firms recognize the changing environment and thus
engage with CSR as part of a conscious emergent strategy; (4) innovation and learning
approach, where active engagement with CSR both provides fresh opportunities to understand the marketplace and enhances organizational learning, all of which fosters competitive
advantage. Id.
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from a firm’s own misconduct.451 As has been shown, activists have been
quick to expose firms that engage in disingenuous image-laundering tactics.452 Any attempt to deceive the public, in today’s age of far-reaching,
decentralized media, will quickly cause reputational harm.
In other words, reputational capital is generated from CSR backed by
genuine intention. A company will find it difficult to capitalize on compliance with civil regulations unless it has explicitly declared its moral
commitment. Companies that exhibit the “it pays to be ethical” attitude
will be undermining their efforts in the long run. From a purely financial
standpoint, it arguably pays to appreciate the intrinsic value of good
business conduct. Executives of multinational corporations should guide
their organizations’ actions by this premise.
Finally, some critics contend that the bulk of global CSR practices resemble corporate philanthropic efforts in the sense that they are situated
at the outer margins rather than at the core of firms’ business strategies.453 Thus, critics see the CSR practices more as constituting inoculation
against public denunciation than as an effort at long-term competitive
advantage. On the other hand, such companies as American Apparel,
British Petroleum, Seventh Generation, Starbucks, Timberland, and
Whole Foods make CSR commitments a vital component of their brands
and their core business policies.454 As it is commonly suggested in order
to debunk the widespread misconception that costly Madison Avenue
advertising campaigns do not really work: if that were really true, then
why would companies continue to spend so much on them?
CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to delineate the transformative trends in
global governance that are backed by reputational capital. This change is
taking place through emerging civil regulations enforced by reputational
accountability mechanisms established by global civil society to impose
responsibility on firms for environmental and social standards. Several
451. See, e.g., Janet E. Kerr, The Creative Capitalism Spectrum: Evaluating Corporate
Social Responsibility Through a Legal Lens, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 831, 854 (2008).
452. See Deva, supra note 442, at 148.
453. See, e.g., Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy and Society: The Link
Between Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Dec. 2006, at 78–92.
454. See generally Ruth V. Aguilera et al., Putting the S Back in Corporate Social
Change in Organizations 5–6 (U. Ill. College of Bus., Working Paper No. 04-0107,
2004); Rimmy Malhotra, Corporate Social Responsibility Done Right, THE MOTLEY
FOOL, Oct. 3, 2007, http://www.fool.com/investing/value/2007/10/03/corporate-socialresponsibility-done-right.aspx.

106

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 35:1

factors have caused the emergence of CSR, including: economic globalization, the development of global civil society, and the role multinational
enterprises have begun to play as private authorities. The efforts of businesses to advance human rights and to promote ethical, responsible, and
sustainable practices continue to mature, manifesting in the advent of
civil regulations and the emergence of a regime of global economic
governance.
The rise of CSR is also the result of firms—pressured by the corporate
accountability movement—seeking to address the social and ecological
byproducts of their conduct. A set of self-regulating norms and mechanisms, along with multi-stakeholder initiatives and co-regulation, guide
CSR. The global corporate governance paradigm continues to be shaped
by ethical standards and the pursuit of greater accountability for business.
As corporate social responsibility adjusts to meet expectations for transnational business conduct, it will coalesce within the space of reputational
capital theory. Thus, reputational accountability will continue to fill the
ever-expanding gap between national regulations and the burgeoning
multitude of “soft law” civil regulations.

